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INTRODUCTION
Imagine that all the counties of the world are personified and sitting in a dark
room. They don’t know who each other is, but they still regularly interact, such as when
they trade goods and fight. The wealthy nations are fairly familiar with each other and
frequently trade with each other. However, recently, someone in the room who they are
un-familiar with has begun trading with the others much more frequently and is getting to
be as wealthy as the other wealthy nations. They notice this nation trades with the others
in a more restrictive fashion. The wealthier nations are becoming a little concerned
because the new guy is taking away some of their trading advantages. In addition, it is
trading with people that the wealthier nations don’t like and would prefer not be traded
with. They observe the new guy growing more and more successful. The wealthy nations
naturally would really like to know what this new guy has planned. Doesn’t he care about
not trading with the bad guys? Why is he so restrictive with his trading? How is he
getting so successful?
If ever the lights were to come on, the wealthy nations would recognize the new
guy as China. However, their questions and concerns about China would remain as in the
darkness, for China is an enigma. It is an enigma that is becoming increasingly important
in the modern ‘flat world’.1
China is following a unique path to development. Inspired by the
communist/socialist philosophies of Karl Marx and Lenin, China along with the USSR,
emerged though revolution in the middle of the 20th Century. China watched as its former

1

The term ‘flat world’ is a reference to, THOMAS FRIEDMAN, THE WORLD IS FLAT (2006). In which the
author discusses the increasing competitiveness of modern businesses due to the effects of globalization
and technology. In particular the author develops the thesis that emerging powers like China are becoming
increasing important due to factors such as outsourcing and global supply chains.
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comrade, the USSR, rapidly instituted democracy and free capitalism and thereafter
immediately collapsed economically. China thus learned a valuable lesson and has
instituted its economic reforms through much more gradual and controlled measures.
The purpose of this paper is to shed light on the very nature of some of these
reforms. In particular it focuses on Chinese domestic capital markets2, how the
government and State Owned Enterprises (SOE’s)3 interact within the market, and how
this affects fairness and equality within both the domestic and international markets.
It may safely be assumed that the Chinese government is in control of its own
economic development. Therefore, the perceived regulatory inadequacies in the Chinese
capital markets may have a purpose unique to the Chinese government. The paper puts
forth the proposition that the reason the Chinese government is not regulating some
aspects of its capital markets after Western markets is because it realizes a benefit for the
government in those inadequacies.
In Part I the current paradigm for analyzing China’s capital market reform is
critically evaluated and China’s overall motivations in capital market reform are
discussed. Part II is about the development and nature of Chinese capital markets. This
part also looks at state ownership, new regulatory bodies and reforms, and recent
international trade issues potentially affecting China’s capital markets.
Part III goes into detail concerning a number of specific legal issues in China
affecting their capital markets. In particular laws affecting fiduciary duties, insider
2

Capital markets are intended to mean the domestic stock exchanges on mainland China, excluding Hong
Kong and Taiwan due to their unique historical and legal developments.
3
SOE’s can refer to a wide variety of business organizations in mainland China, See generally Cindy
Schipani and Junhai Liu, Corporate Governance in China: Then and Now, 2002 Colum. Bus. L. Rev. 1,
16-24 (2002) (these include closely held corporations, wholly state-owned corporations, foreign-invested
corporations, Chinese-foreign Equity Joint Ventures, Chinese-Foreign Contratual Joint Ventures, etc). For
the purposes of this article the terms SOE is meant to refer generically to enterprises in China in which the
Chinese government owns a substantial amount.
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trading, private securities litigation, and the WTO are analyzed. Part III begins with an
overview of the structure of the government in China in order to put the legal system and
accountability of its regulatory bodies in context.
Part IV critically looks at the deficiencies in laws governing Chinese capital
markets and how these deficiencies might actually benefit the government. This leads to
the development of a new paradigm for analyzing Chinese capital market reforms.
Finally a few meager suggestions are offering in the context of this new paradigm to
demonstrate how using the new paradigm could effect critical legal evaluation of China’s
capital markets.

PART I: Current Paradigm and Motivations
Part I examines the current paradigm with which Western scholars examine
Chinese legal reforms. Generally the current paradigm is ineffective for several reasons
which the following section will briefly discuss. In light of the ineffectiveness of the
current paradigm some basic motivating factors behind China’s reform measures are
looked into.
Part IA: Current Paradigm
In order to better understand Chinese economic development it may be useful to
reexamine the largely dominant paradigm of many western scholars who examine the
Chinese economy.4 The dominant paradigm of legal scholars refers to their shared

4

In general, a dominant paradigm refers to the basic accepted beliefs or model held by those examining a
certain condition or event. See generally THOMAS KUHN, THE STRUCTURE OF SCIENTIFIC REVOLUTIONS
(3rd ed. 1996).
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understanding of basic theories and concepts, the common language which they use, and
their common methodology”.5 In other words they share a common ‘legal culture’.6
Western legal scholars who examine the Chinese economy tend to hold a certain
dominant paradigm which Donald Clarke calls the Ideal Western Legal Order (IWLO).7
They then use a reductive methodology by applying suggestions replicating the IWLO
which will result in China having a satisfactory legal reform.8 This leads to a great deal
of analyzing Chinese law comparatively to Western laws, finding Chinese law
inadequate9, and then simply urging the replication of successful western models, which
reflect a subjective view of how the law should be10, into the Chinese legal framework.11

5

Mark Van Hoecke and Mark Warrington, Legal Cultures, Legal Paradigms and Legal Doctrine: Towards
a New Model for Comparative Law, 495 Int’l and Comp. L. Quart’ly.514 (1998).
6
Id. “Such a common legal culture includes shared understanding on, at least, the following points”,
“1) A concept of what the law is and its relationship to other social norms, 2) A theory of valid legal
sources. Who has the power to make the law and under what conditions. What is the hierarchy of the legal
sources. How problems of collision between legal sources solved, 3) A methodology of law, both for the
making and the adjudication of law. What rights do adjudicators have to interpret the law.,4) A theory of
argumentation. Which kinds of arguments and of argumentative strategy are acceptable, 5) A theory of
legitimating of the law. Why is it binding? What if it conflicts with some other, non-legal, social norms.
6) A common basic ideology: common basic values and a common basic world view. A common view on
the role of law in society and on the role of lawyers. A view on which problems are considered to be legal
problems, to be solved properly by the legal system, and not just, moral or economic problems, which
remain outside the realm of law.”
7
Walter Hutchens, Private Securities Litigation in China: Material Disclosure About China’s Legal
System, 24 U. Pa. Int’l Econ. L. 624 (2003). Citing DONALD C. CLARKE, PUZZLING OBSERVVATIONS IN
CHINESE LAW: WHEN IS A RIDDLE JUST A MISTAKE?, IN UNDERSTANDING CHINA’S LEGAL SYSTEM 93 (C.
Stephen Hsu ed., 2003)
8
See Michael William Dowdle, Essay Preserving Indigenous Paradigms in an Age of Globalization:
Pragmatic Strategies for the Development of Clinical Legal Aid in China, 24 Fordham Int’l L.J. 59 (2000)
(“International development projects need to shift their focus from one of simply replicating successful
foreign models (what we will call a reductive strategy) to one of promoting discovery of the indigenous
developmental implications and possibilities inherent in the domestic environment (what we will call a
pragmatic strategy.”).
9
See id. at 68 (noting that reductivist tend to view China’s development pessimistically while those that
focus on more pragmatic comparison are more optimistic).
10
See Van Hoecke, supra note 5, at 528 (“When describing the law, the doctrinal legal writer is constantly,
either implicitly or explicitly, formulating hypotheses as regards the meaning of legal concepts, legal rules,
legal principles or legal institutions. These hypotheses are checked on the basis of material which generally
are considered to be authoritative and by using the classical interpretation methods. Accepting an
interpretation, eventually, is not based on some “objective” certainly but on an inter-subjective consensus
with the legal community”.).
11
See generally, Guanghau Yu, Using Western Law to Improve China’s State-Owned Enterprises: of
Takeovers and Securities Fraud, 39 Val. U.L. Rev. 339 (2004); Yuwa Wei, The Development of the
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In general this paradigm is mostly adequate. Western securities laws are after all
viewed as relatively successful.12 In addition its familiarity to Western scholars and long
period of development and practice provides a powerful tool for scholars to approach the
developing Chinese economic legal regime. Chinese lawmakers have even been openly
solicitous of these Western legal reforms.13 In fact, Chinese laws have incorporated many
Western made legal ideas into their developing legal regime.14
However it is becoming increasingly clear that simply replicating Western legal
ideas into the Chinese legal framework is unworkable.15 Examples abound where
applying Western legal ideas to Chinese law simply does work due to the fundamental
differences between Chinese and Western economic philosophies.16 Continuing to
Securities Market and Regulation in China, 27 Loy. L.A. Int’l & Comp. L. Rev. 479 (2005); and Nicholas
Howson, Speech: Regulation of Companies with Publicly Listed Share Capital in the People’s Republic of
China, 38 Cornell Int’l L.J. 237 (2005).
12
This is demonstrated by the success of Western capital markets, particularly in the US and London which
follow a Western style regulatory framework, suggesting a correlation between their regulatory methods
and overall stock market performance. There are of course a few noteworthy exceptions, such as the major
financial scandals beginning with Enron, which suggest that even the Western system is not perfect.
13
See Hutchens, supra note 7, at 672 (noting that “When Chinese legal enactments fall short of what
outside observers would like, it is rarely because China to observe the outside world. It is more likely that
perceived deficiencies in Chinese law arise from political and prudential constraints.”).
14
See Yuma Wei, Volatility of China’s Securities Markets and Corporate Governance, 29 Suffolk
Transnat’l L Rev. 227 (2006) (noting that for example the CSRC is modeled after the US having a strong
national regulatory body to govern securities markets. Professor Wei goes on to note that even if China
adopts more US like legislation there is still a problem with enforcement of that legislation that makes it
less sure to work).
15
See Randall Peerenboom, Law and Development of Constitutional Democracy in China: Problem or
Paradigm?, 19 Colum. J. Asian L. 197 (2005) (“While there are technical aspects to legal reform, the
reform process is inherently political, with many discrete decisions to be made, often among second-best
alternatives. Few if any reforms are Pareto improvements. Rather, there are winners and losers, both among
individual citizens and state organs of power. Yet rather than allowing domestic political systems to weight
the costs and benefits, international actors are attempting to influence, if not outright dictate outcomes. Not
surprisingly, in Asia and elsewhere, countries at low levels of wealth that have taken on the broader agenda
and attempted to democratize and implement a full range of social and economic as well as civil and
political rights have often experienced disappointing results.”).
This is of course not to say that Western legal ideas are anyway inferior to China’s. However it is becoming
clear that the unique characteristics of the Chinese culture may make application of Western legal ideas
unsuitable. See generally Dowdle, supra note 8, at 66.
16
See Van Hoecke, supra note 5, at 506 (“The Asian collectivist approach, seen most prominently in China
but also in Japan, was determined principally under the influence of the Confucian theory of the natural
order of reality. According to this traditional oriental thought every person has a duty to respect the natural
order of things at the risk of disturbing this order. Individual rights are considered to be contrary to that
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advocate for inapplicable legal norms to be applied to the Chinese economic law is not
beneficial.17
The reasons these ideal Western reforms will not work in China are too numerous
and complex to address in the scope of this article.18 However, what is becoming clear is
the awareness of an anomaly between the paradigm that scholars use to view Chinese
reforms and reality. Better understanding is achieved through an exploration of this
anomaly until finally the paradigm has somehow been adjusted so that the anomalous has
become the expected.19
In the context of Chinese securities regulation this means examining the paradigm
that Western securities regulation rules are better than the current Chinese laws and
should be adopted, exploring why this paradigm in many cases simply cannot work in
China, and then adjusting the paradigm until we can predict which reforms are really
workable in China and which aren’t.
natural order. The individual has no rights but only duties toward others and towards society. When using
his individual rights, the individual, wrongly, opposes society. By claiming his rights he is damaging
society with his combative attitude. Therefore, conflicts are preferable not brought before the court but
solved through reconciliation.”). See also Jiangyu Wang, Dancing With Wolves: Regulation and
Deregulation of Foreign Investment in China’s Stock Market, 5 Asian-Pacific L. & Pol’y J. 37 (2004)
(noting former CSRC chairman’s attempts to model the CSRC after the SEC were futile due to the
uniqueness of the Chinese market); Dowdle, supra note 8, at 62 (noting how China civil law system does
not recognize case law precedent and that this limits the social impact of litigation thus making the
American paradigm much less effective); Benedict Sheehy, Fundamentally Conflicting Views of the Rule of
Law in China and the West & Implications for Commercial Disputes, 26 NW. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 2258
(2006) (“Each scholar comes to a problem with her or his own mindset, point of view, assumptions, and
understanding of the law. Not only is this plethora of views evident within legal traditions, but it greatly
and perhaps excessively influences and thwarts comparative work”); Sheehy, supra note 16, at 238 (noting
how the even the basic principle of law may have significantly different meaning in China than it does in
the West.); and at 252 (noting that the concept of reducing the power of the CCP in order to fit better with
the rule of law under the WTO is not accepted in China)
17
See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 231 (“When laws are radically at odds with the deeply held views of
the dominant majority, they are rarely implemented. This creates a gap between law on the books and
actual practice that undermines respect for the legal system and rule of law, and fuels a resentful
nationalism in Asia and other developing countries over the neo-imperialistic imposition of contested
values.”).
18
See Dowdle, supra note 8, at 66 (stating that knowledge of local conditions and cultures is crucial to
effective legal development, and “identifying which of these structures and dynamic are relevant to, and
can be employed in, service of legal development.”).
19
See KUHN, supra note 4, at 53.
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The development of a better paradigm will result in benefits that are highly
critical at this moment in the international economy.20 A better paradigm will allow those
concerned to better understand what China’s legal reforms mean and how they are
intended by the Chinese to operate. In effect, there needs to be a paradigm shift between
looking at how Western legal scholars think legal reforms should operate in Chinese
capital markets to looking at how the Chinese government thinks they should operate.

Part IB: The Motivation for Legal Reforms
In order to accomplish the goal of developing a better paradigm a good place to
start is to examine the motivation behind the enactment of various laws and reforms in
China. Two fundamental motivators are useful to keep in mind when examining Chinese
law; money and power.
i. The Need for Money
To understand the effect certain laws are intended to have on the capital markets a
good starting point is to follow the money. Following the money is useful due to the close
relationship between money and governmental power.21 Access to money is essential to
the CCP in order to create and sustain power.22 Money is also a temptress for corruption

20

See Dowdle, supra note 8, at 63 (“inefficient developmental paradigms do become harmful when they
begin to prevent the development of more efficient paradigms.”).
21
See, ALEXANDER HAMILTON, THE FEDERALIST PAPERS NO. 30: CONCERNING THE GENERAL POWERS OF
TAXATION, 1787 (“Money is, with propriety, considered as the vital principle of the body politic; as that
which sustains its life and motion, and enables it to perform its most essential functions. A complete power,
therefore, to procure a regular and adequate supply of it, as far as the resources of the community will
permit, may be regarded as an indispensable ingredient in every constitution. From a deficiency in this
particular, one of two evils must ensue; either the people must be subjected to continual plunder, as a
substitute for a more eligible mode of supplying the public wants, or the government must sink into a fatal
atrophy, and, in a short course of time, perish.”).
22. See Minxin Pei, The Dark Side of China’s Rise, Foreign Policy ( March/April 2006), available at:
http://www.carnegieendowment.org/publications/index.cfm?fa=view&id=18110 (“The strong belief in
gradual but inexorable economic liberalization often has a political corollary: that market forces will
eventually produce civil liberties and political pluralism. It’s a comforting thought. Yet these optimistic
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of politicians.23 Evaluating China’s capital market reforms in the context that they may be
using these reforms in order to benefit the government financially should be considerable
a plausible and important concept.
ii. Maintaining Power through Markets
The Chinese government’s power to control the regulation of markets is one the
most powerful tools it has to promote social stability, because it can arrange the markets
in its favor to finance its own supremacy over the people.24 Examining how the Chinese
government exercises this self perpetuating power is essential to understanding how they
intend market regulations to work.25

visions tend to ignore the neo-Leninist regime’s desperate need for unfettered access to economic spoils.
Few authoritarian regimes can maintain power through coercion alone. Most mix coercion with patronage
to secure support from key constituencies, such as the bureaucracy, the military, and business interests.”).
23
See Pai, supra note 22 (“The most corrupt sectors in China, such as power generation, tobacco, banking,
financial services, and infrastructure, are all state-controlled monopolies.” “Various indicators, pieced
together from official sources, suggest endemic graft within the state. The number of “large-sum cases”
(those involving monetary amounts greater than $6,000) nearly doubled between 1992 and 2002, indicating
that more wealth is being looted by corrupt officials. The rot appears to be spreading up the ranks, as more
and more senior officials have been ensnared. The number of officials at the county level and above
prosecuted by the government rose from 1,386 in 1992 to 2,925 in 2002.”) continuing (“An optimist might
believe that these figures reveal stronger enforcement rather than metastasizing corruption, but the evidence
suggests otherwise. Dishonest officials today face little risk of serious punishment. On average, 140,000
party officials and members were caught in corruption scandals each year in the 1990s, and 5.6 percent of
these were criminally prosecuted. In 2004, 170,850 party officials and members were implicated, but only
4,915 (or 2.9 percent) were subject to criminal prosecution. The culture of official impunity is thriving in
China.”)
24
See Sheehy, supra note 16, at 232 (“In societies based on economic power and rights, as opposed to those
societies developed on politico-social relations, those with economic power reinforce those economic
institutions which expand their control and favor development that advances their power and rights”)
continuing (noting that in stable democratic governments that are under no threat of rebellion the
government has given over considerable control to economic actors such as corporations which tend to
have a stabilizing effect).
25
See Pai, supra note 22 (“Today, Beijing oversees a vast patronage system that secures the loyalty of
supporters and allocates privileges to favored groups. The party appoints 81 percent of the chief executives
of state-owned enterprises and 56 percent of all senior corporate executives. The corporate reforms
implemented since the late 1990s—designed to turn wholly state-owned firms into shareholding
companies—haven’t made a dent in patronage. In large- and medium-sized state enterprises (ostensibly
converted into shareholding companies, some of which are even traded on overseas stock markets), the
Communist Party secretaries and the chairmen of the board were the same person about half the time. In 70
percent of the 6,275 large- and medium-sized state enterprises classified as “corporatized” as of 2001, the
members of the party committee were members of the board of directors. All told, 5.3 million party
officials—about 8 percent of its total membership and 16 percent of its urban members—held executive
positions in state enterprises in 2003, the last year for which figures were available.”).
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In China a single body has almost complete power, the Chinese Communist
Party.26 With over 70 million members and growing with members monopolizing all
important government positions and acting according to Party policy, the CCP’s power
over the government and market in China is unchallenged.27 In fact it could be argued
that the Chinese Communist Party is the most powerful body in the world based on the
sheer amount of control it exercises over its countrymen and the sheer size of its
country.28
However the CCP’s power is not absolute power and it is certainly not an
inherently permanent power. With the huge amount of control it exercises over its
citizens lives comes a huge amount of obligations and responsibilities.29 The populace
must be placated otherwise there is civil unrest and a potential for the lose of power
through rebellion. This situation is intimately familiar to the CCP, which has witnesses

26

See Melinda Liu and Jonathan Ansfield, Life of the Party, Newsweek International, May 23, 2005,
available at:http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/7937214/site/newsweek (“The past two decades of sizzling
economic growth should not obscure the fact that the Communist Party remains an opaque, hidebound,
Leninist-style hierarchy. Party always trumps government. A provincial party secretary always has more
clout than the governor. At the national level, the nine-person CCP Politburo Standing Committee always
runs the show.”); Sheehy, supra note 16, at 225 (noting how the CCP is the basis of of all Law in China)
and at page 234 (noting that while Western governments advocate a separation of powers, the CCP views
itself, the government, and the will of the people as a single entity and has resisted separation of these
powers).
27
See China Daily a semi-official government website, available at http://www.chinatoday.com/org/cpc/
28
The CCP considers itself masters of the people with the ability to mobilize them at its will. See Jiang
Zemin, 16th National Congress of the Communist Party of China, 2002, available at:
http://www.china.org.cn/english/features/49007.htm#6 (“The CPC is the core of leadership for the cause of
socialism with Chinese characteristics. Governance by the Communist Party means that it leads and
supports the people in acting as the masters of the country and mobilizes and organizes them on a most
extensive scale to manage state and social affairs and economic and cultural undertakings according to law,
safeguarding and realizing their fundamental interests.”).With this kind of control over 1.3 billion people,
not to mention it’s control over the enormous Chinese army, it is not a stretch to say the CCP is the most
powerful governing body on the planet.
29
Initially the CCP promised the people “cradle-to-the-grave” support in all matters of social life, primarily
through their guaranteed employers. With the decline of this system the CCP itself is struggling to fill the
social needs gap for the people.
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massive civil unrest that continues to grow.30 In fact, many of China’s notorious human
rights abuses, such as limited free speech, are directly related to its desire to control and
prevent civil unrest.31
In order to satisfy its citizens and thus retain its power the CCP is necessarily
becoming increasingly concerned with wealth.32 Accordingly, the CCP is beginning to

30

The number of social protest in China is steadily on the rise. See the following graph in Murray Scot
Taner, Testimony, China’s State Control Mechanism and Methods, U.S.-China Economic and Security
Review Commission. April 14, 2005. available at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/written_testimonies/05_04_14wrts/tanner_murray_wrts.htm

See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 217 (Seems to apply a “Learned Hand formula” to Chinese reform, in
that considering one-fifth of the worlds population lives in China, almost half in poverty, the consequences
of instability in China, the region, and the world which would be very severe, there may be a argument
made that tolerating China’s various abuses of rights and the rule of law should be tolerated so as to avoid
this outcome); Pai, supra note 22 (“Since the Tiananmen Square tragedy, the party has invested billions in
beefing up the paramilitary police force (the People’s Armed Police) that has been deployed in suppressing
internal unrest. To counter the threat posed by the information revolution, and especially the Internet, the
Chinese government has blended technological savvy with regulatory might. The Chinese “Internet police,”
officially known as the Ministry of Public Security’s Internet and Security Supervision Bureau, is
reportedly more than 30,000 strong. Its Beijing branch proudly claimed that, in 2002, it participated in a
multi-agency exercise to see whether the government could rid the Internet of “harmful content” within 48
hours of the onset of an emergency. (During the exercise, all “harmful content” was removed in 19 hours.)
The party’s refined strategy of “selective repression” targets only those who openly challenge its authority
while leaving the general public alone. China is one of the few authoritarian states where homosexuality
and cross-dressing are permitted, but political dissent is not.”).
31
See Peerenboom, supra note 15 at 214 (noting that critics point out that the East Asian countries that have
succeed in maintaining stability and social order, achieving economic growth...have adopted a restrictive
approach to civil and political rights). But see Id. at 212-213 (noting an increasingly important role of the
press in china through media outlets such as the internet which has become to break free from government
control and influence the government through mass petitions and other methods).
32
See Pai, supra note 22 (“A generation ago, the offspring of the ruling elite took up positions in the
government or military; today, they go into business.” Traditionally this has not been a very fruitful
relationship. See Id. (“Party membership and business acumen do not often go together. Because of the
party’s fixation with high growth, government officials are rewarded for delivering, or appearing to deliver,

13

Party members for private sector positions which it helps to place them into.33 All and all,
it appears the CCP has no intention of relinquishing its control over the economy but
rather it’s seeking new methods of manifesting that control.34
In order to determine who the CCP manifests these goals it is necessary to
examine the structure of the markets in which they operate. Specifically, the next section
examines how the market is structured and the CCP’s participation in it through SOE’s,
regulations, and regulatory bodies.

Part II: Development, Reform, and Actions of China’s Market Economy
This section examines the development and operation of capital markets in China.
In order to place that development in context, it is necessary to examine the
characterization of the Chinese market. The question of whether the Chinese market is
really a ‘market’ in the Western sense is important because it will shed light on the
degree of “opening up” that the CCP has really initiated and thus the degree that capital
markets are intended to be free from government interference.

Part IIA: China’s Market Hybrid

precisely that. This incentive structure fuels a massive misallocation of capital to “image projects” (such as
new factories, luxury shopping malls, recreational facilities, and unnecessary infrastructure) that burnish
local officials’ records and strengthen their chances of promotion. The results of these mistakes—gleaming
office complexes, industrial parks, landscaped highways, and public squares—tend to impress Western
visitors, who view them as further proof of China’s economic prowess.”).
33
See Liu, supra note 26 (“Now the party seems determined not simply to control China Inc., but to
become it. That means the party—which used to execute landlords and persecute former capitalists—is now
training private-sector business executives who are contributing significantly to China's economic boom.”).
34
See Barry Naughton, Market Economy, Hierarchy, and Single Party Rule: How Does the Transition Pat
in China Shape the Emerging Market Economy?, International Economic Association, 9 (2004) (Noting
that it appears that the CCP has recently began to reassert and centralize its power over the economy in
recent years by strengthening ties to the provinces and streamlining its administrative control).
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An accurate characterization of the Chinese economy in recent years has proven a
difficult task due to apparently competing interests of communist controlled state
socialism and emerging market capitalism. In the beginning it was clear that PRC was a
communist state with a centrally planned socialist economy modeled largely on MarxLenin models derived from the USSR. In those early years, China remained isolated from
the West and pursued a centrally planned socialist economy.35 This socialist economic
model was found to be very inefficient due to the fact that it was not based on market
factors such as increasing profit but rather on increasing social stability often at the cost
of making profits.36
In 1979 Chinese president Xidong introduced new market based reforms in order
to improve and modernize the Chinese economy.37 When China began to modernize its
economy and open up to the world, it became less clear what the nature of China’s
economy was.38 It appears that China is moving along the spectrum away from a

35

See Chong-En Bai, Jiangyong Lu, and Zhigang Tao, The Multitask Theory of State Enterprise Reform:
Empirical Evidence from China, Stanford Center for International Development (working paper) 4 (May
2006) (“Prior to 1979, the government planned all economic activity. Companies received funding from
government run banks according to the plan of the Central Planning Commission. Workers were
guaranteed lifetime employment pensions and heath care and other services in exchange for low wages.”).
36
Id. (“In general this system was found to be very inefficient as companies and employees had little
incentive for innovation and improvement. They stuck to the plan authored by the Central Planning
Commission because the state essentially was a cash flow mechanism for poorly performing companies
through the central banks.”) (“Even today there is no well-functioning independent social security network
in China and SOE’s are increasingly being relied upon to provide that sort of social stability in China.”).
This may also be an addition reason why the state is interested in keeping SOE’s even if they do not
perform well.
37
Id. at 3 (noting that at first these market reforms were mainly based on giving greater operation
autonomy to SOE’s as well as allowing increasing numbers of private owned companies).
38
See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 232 (“Although China is often portrayed as a country dominated by
the rigid ideology of Leninist socialism, Chinese leaders have in fact been resolutely pragmatic, as captured
by Deng Xiaoping’s homely advice that the color of the cat matters not as long as it captures mice”.). See
Naughton, supra note 34, at 4-6 (noting that one of the reasons for this is the very gradual approach that
China took in the early years of its reforms. These reforms appear to have been gradual so as to allow the
power hierarchy to preserve its position in the economy while increasing its overall productivity.) Id., at 5
(“This appearance is also likely based on the view that the more market orientated a country becomes the
less powerful its state economic control becomes eventually leading according to so to democracy as the
final phase of reform.”). See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 188, (“Moreover, capitalism, rule of law,

15

centrally planned socialist state to a market economy.39 However, the Chinese
government’s involvement in the economy is still comparatively very high.40
China has made many important moves that indicate it is moving towards a freer
market economy such as reforming its legal and economic structure to attract foreign
investors.41 Another example is Chinas’ diligent efforts to gain membership into the

democracy, and human rights are sufficiently contested in theory and varied in practice, much to chagrin of
those who would choose to impose a hilly idiosyncratic version of liberal democracy on the China, the final
outcome in China cannot, at this point, be accurately predicted.”).
39
But see Chong-En Bai, supra note 35, at 3 (One of the reasons China has been pushed to more economic
reforms is that is SOE’s were constantly losing out to private run Chinese companies. In other words the
state sector was not able to compete in its present form with private business).
40

Pei, Foreign Policy, “The Chinese state remains deeply entrenched in the economy. According to official
data for 2003, the state directly accounted for 38 percent of the country’s GDP and employed 85 million
people (about one third of the urban workforce). For its part, the formal private sector in urban areas
employed only 67 million people. A research report by the financial firm UBS argues that the private sector
in China accounts for no more than 30 percent of the economy. These figures are startling even for Asia,
where there is a tradition of heavy state involvement in the economy. State-owned enterprises in most
Asian countries contribute about 5 percent of GDP. In India, traditionally considered a socialist economy,
state-owned firms generate less than 7 percent of GDP.
But China’s tentacles are even more securely wrapped around the economy than these figures suggest.
First, Beijing continues to own the bulk of capital. In 2003, the state controlled $1.2 trillion worth of capital
stock, or 56 percent of the country’s fixed industrial assets. Second, the state remains, as befits a
quintessentially Leninist regime, securely in control of the “commanding heights” of the economy: It is
either a monopolist or a dominant player in the most important sectors, including financial services,
banking, telecommunications, energy, steel, automobiles, natural resources, and transportation. It protects
its monopoly profits in these sectors by blocking private domestic firms and foreign companies from
entering the market (although in a few sectors, such as steel, telecom, and automobiles, there is competition
among state firms). Third, the government maintains tight control over most investment projects through
the power to issue long-term bank credit and grant land-use rights. China’s business cycle is therefore
driven by Beijing.
Private-sector firms have very limited access to finance or new markets. The state even dominates many
ostensibly deregulated sectors, such as the brewing industry, the retail sector, and textiles. Of the 66
publicly traded retailers in the country, only one is private. There are only 40 private firms among the 1,520
Chinese companies listed on domestic and foreign exchanges.”

41

See e.g. Bradley L. Milkwick, Feeling For Rocks While Crossing the River: The Gradual Evolution of
Chinese Law, 14 J. Transnat’l L. and Pol. 289; Nicholas J. Faleris, Cross-Border Securitized Transactions:
The Missing Link in Establishing a Viable Chinese Securitization Market, 26 Nw. J. Int’l L. & Bus. 201,
201-206 (2005); See Randall Peerenboom, Globalization, Path Dependency and the Limits of Law:
Administrative Reform and Rule of Law in the People’s Republic of China, 19 Berkely J. Int’l L. 161
(2001). Press Release, WTO, WTO Ministerial Conference approves China’s Accession, (Nov. 10, 2001)
available at: http://www.wto.org/english/news_e/pres01_e/pr252_e.htm [“WTO News”];
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WTO in 2001.42 In general, China has been increasingly making international
investments seemingly indicates its acceptance of free market economies.43
China’s Constitution commits it to developing a socialist market economy.44
Socialism generally means state ownership of the means of production and exchange and
a centrally planned economy.45 A market economy is usually understood as an economy
in which goods and services are freely traded without state ownership.46 In China this
works out to government ownership and control over the pillars are most important assets
of the country with mixed and private ownership allowed.47
The degree in which the socialist government regulates, plans and controls that
market has an enormous impact on the health of the economy and those affected by it.

42

WTO News, supra note 41 (“Under the chairmanship of Ambassador Pierre-Louis Girard of Switzerland,
the Working Party concluded on 17 September almost 15 years of negotiations with China and agreed to
forward some 900 pages of legal text for formal acceptance by the 142 Member governments of the
WTO.”).

43

Chinas Securities and Futures Markets, CSRC, 5 (April 2004) (“As of the end of December 2003, a total
of 93 domestic companies had been listed overseas, raising 27.1 billion US dollars in total. Among them,
18 companies including big companies like People's Insurance Company of China (PICC), Sinotrans,
Chinalife and Avichina were newly listed in overseas stock markets in 2003. The 18 companies raised 6.5
billion US dollars in total in the overseas money market via public initial offering and refinancing in the
secondary market.”).

44

Constitution of the People’s Republic of China, (2002) Preamble.
Merriam-Webster Online dictionary, available at http://www.m-w.com/dictionary/socialism
46
This does not mean that state ownership in publicly listed companies does not occur in the West. See
Sheldon Gao, China Stock Market in Global Perspective, DOW JONES INDEXES (Sept. 2002) (noting
that even the US and Japan governments have ownership shares in publicly listed companies. There amount
of ownership is however usually restricted to industries like telecommunications and public utilizes and the
size of the ownership shares has been shrinking.)
47
See Ken Imai, Explaining the Persistence of State-ownership in China, Institute of Developing
Economies (discussion paper) 4 (June 2006) (“what exactly the key assets are has not been defined by the
government” However it is generally thought that high initial capital industries such as oil, heavy industry,
infrastructure, etc. will remain SOE.”).
This type of market has been called neo-Leninist. See Pei, supra note 22 (“Unlike Maoism, neo-Leninism
blends one-party rule and state control of key sectors of the economy with partial market reforms and an
end to self-imposed isolation from the world economy. The Maoist state preached egalitarianism and relied
on the loyalty of workers and peasants. The neo-Leninist state practices elitism, draws its support from
technocrats, the military, and the police, and co-opts new social elites (professionals and private
entrepreneurs) and foreign capital—all vilified under Maoism. Neo-Leninism has rendered the ruling
Chinese Communist Party more resilient but has also generated self-destructive forces.”).
45
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Nowhere is this interplay more evident than in China’s capital markets.48 Capital markets
play a crucial role in a countries economic development.49 In addition considering the
size and global impact of China’s capital markets, the importance of determining the
nature of China’s economy is becoming critical.50

Part IIB: Development of China’s Capital Market
Chinese capital markets reappeared in China in the 1980’s.51 They began
sporadically at the local and provincial level until their lack of uniformity prompted the

48

Chinas Securities and Futures, CSRC, 6 (“It (Chinas capital market) has now become a key component
of China’s socialist market economy and played a vital role in the reform and development of state-owned
enterprises (SOEs) and financial markets, in mobilizing resources, in facilitating structural adjustment and
economic growth.”).
49
See Wang, supra note 16, at 2 (noting the work of economist John Hicks who advocates that financial
markets are crucial to economic development) and (“financial institutions help facilitate private and official
capital flows, channel investment and resources to their most efficient and productive uses, encourage
technological innovations, and in so doing, perform the function of shifting risk to those who are willing to
bear it, as well as reducing the information costs of making transactions in market economies.”).
50
See Solomon Tadesse, Testimony, Hearing on China and Capital Markets, U.S.-China Economic and
Security Review Commission (2005) available at
http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/hr05_08_11.htm (arguing that China is using its unique its
unique financial relationship with its state owned enterprises to place it in an unfair advantage to buy
strategic assets around the world.) This concern also arises due to evidence that China may be using its
capital markets to raise money for activities at odds with its purported goals of becoming a responsible
member of the world economy. See Frank J. Gaffney Jr., Testimony: Chinese Penetration of the Global
Capital Markets: Are American Investors Unwittingly Buying the Rope to be Used for Their Hanging?,
Hearing on China and Capital Markets, U.S.-China Economic and Security Review Commission (2005)
available at: http://www.uscc.gov/hearings/2005hearings/hr05_08_11.htm (noting companies such as
Sinopec and COSCO are through their corporate relationships and subsidiaries engaging in illegal activities
and relations with terrorist states. For example China National Petroleum Companys heavy interest in
Sudans oil lead to reports of thousands of Chinese helping the genocide government in its atrocities in order
to clear the way for oil production. Also Sinopecs $70 billion dollar investment in Iran. Sinopec’s
subsidiaries have also been sanctioned for selling chemical weapons and technology to Iran. Or Norinco
which is notorious weapons proliferators and is listed on Shezen stock exchange. These companies are all
publicly listed and manage to put on a respectable face to attract massive foreign investments. For example,
Sinopecs 3.4 billion dollar foreign investment receipt in 2000. This has lead one professor to remark, “I am
concerned that the PRC’s efforts to bring its dubious state-owned enterprises to the world’s capital markets
is not evidence of a Communist Chinese commitment to free trade. Rather, it is a reflection of Beijing’s
refinement of the quote attributed to Lenin: They want the capitalists to buy the rope with which China
ultimately will hang them.”).
51

See, e.g., Wang, supra note 16, at 5-6 (noting that the first stock market in China was actually created in
1869, but that the Communist party eliminated securities markets in 1959 as part of its efforts to eliminate
all forms of private property. Therefore there were no securities markets in China for nearly thirty years).
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central government to consider a standard securities exchange system through China.52 In
the early 1990’s two national stock markets emerged at Shanghai and Shenzhen which
each have regulatory functions over their own markets.53 China’s stock market was
initially launched as an effort to finance its ailing SOE’s and to improve their
performance through public listing.54
Major bodies of law in the 1990’s were passed such as the Company Law and
Securities Law governing listed companies and securities trading. The Company Law
generally governs the establishment and operation of stock companies as well as
regulating their behavior on securities markets.55 The Company law is generally credited
as the legal basis for corporatization in China.56 The Securities Law generally governs the
establishment and operation of stock exchanges and brokerages as well as the general
issuing and trading of shares.57

i. The CSRC
In the early 1990’s the national securities regulation authority was consolidated
into the Chinese Securities Regulatory Commission (CSRC).58 The CSRC’s duties and
powers can be found in the Securities Law.59 The Securities Law grants the CSRC broad

52

See, e.g., Wei, supra note 11, at 488-490.
Id.
54
See, e.g., Wang, supra note 16, at 3.
55
The Company Law was enacted in 1994 and has since not been significantly amended. There has a good
deal of debate concerning the Company law since then with most wanting to amend the Company Law to
include provisions addressing such things as fiduciary duties, classification of shares, etc.
56
See Wei, supra note 11, at 492.
57
See Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 29, 1989 (hereinafter Securities Law)
58
China’s Securities and Futures Markets, CSRC, 4 (2004) (“Prior to the CSRC establishing sole
authority, The People’s Bank, the Ministry of Finance, local governments, and even the stock exchanges
each had regulatory authority over securities markets. As a result the CSRC initially struggled to
consolidate it’s control.”). See Wei, supra note 11, at 489.
59
Securities Law, Arts. 166-174
53
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powers over the securities market including, formulating rules and regulations concerning
the securities markets and the code of conduct of those engaged in the market, inspect
disclosure, and investigate and deal with violations of securities laws and regulations.60
Despite these broad powers the CSRC has no accountability to individual shareholders.61
The CSRC has become an important source of regulations concerning listed
companies that would expected to be found in the Company Law and Securities Law.62
For example the CSRC has established rules concerning independent directors and
corporate governance.63 The number of rules and regulations issued by the CSRC is
prolific. In 2001 alone the CSRC introduced 51 new regulations.64
This lawmaking function of the CSRC is referred to as the ‘development’ of the
market function in contrast to the ‘regulatory’ function of the CSRC.65 While the CSRC
is expected to perform both functions in reality the CSRC tends to emphasis one or the
other depending on who is in charge.66 In 2001 the liberal-Western minded CSRC
Chairman Zhou Xiaochuan who expounded and enforced the regulatory approach was
replaced by a former army veteran who expounds the development approach, because
their were complaints that Zhou’s strong enforcement measures were hurting the
economy.67

60

Securities Law, Art. 167
See Wang, supra note 16, at 345.
62
Id., at 494.
63
Guidelines for Introducing Independent Directors to the Board of Directors of Listed Companies, CSRC
(2001); Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies, CSRC (2002) (hereinafter Governance
Code).
64
See Wang, supra note 16, at 37.
65
See Id., at 34.
66
See Id., at 36.
67
See Id., at 37(“ in 2001 under Zhou the Zhou disciplined more than 81 listed companies and 10
intermediaries. The same year the Chinese stock market suffered a loss of RMB 638 billion and entered a
long bear period. Many investors blamed the CSRC enforcements for these loses. When Zhou’s successor
Shang Fulin took over he made it clear that all the problems “are part of the development and shall be
solved through development”.).
61
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In general the CSRC faces problems with its regulatory functions. It has a small
staff and limited budget.68 Considering the large number of listed companies on China’s
stock markets there is serious doubt that the CSRC can effectively monitor all of them.69
Additionly since the CSRC has sole control of securities regulation it is unlikely that it
will receive any help from other agencies.70

Part IIC. State Assets in Chinese Capital Markets
i. State Owned Enterprises
Since the early nineties the Chinese government had to gradually began
experimenting with forms of mixed ownership through ‘corporatization’ in order to
compete with private businesses.71 This triggered a large sell-off at the local level of
small and medium SOE’s which had been losing money and were not able to be
supported by the local governments.72 In addition the government allowed a large number
of small SOE to file for bankruptcy.73 In contrast large SOE’s, which employee
thousands of workers, have generally not declined.74

68

See Hutchens, supra note 7, at 637.
Id.
70
Id.
71
See Imai, supra note 47, at 5 (“for political reasons the Chinese government does not ever refer to this as
privatization but instead as property rights restructuring”). The Company Law which was passed in 1993
provided the avenue of incorporation for SOE’s.
72
See Imai, supra note 47, at 6 (“this the primary reason why the total number of SOE’s has declined
dramatically in the last decade. However due to the fact that these small and medium companies were
financially losers the overall assets retaining by the state the actual amount of state ownership has not really
decreased. In addition the majority of these sell offs were to managers and employees of the companies ad
not to outsiders. The sell off was so large that the central government had to step in at the local level and
slow down the sale of state assets by establishing stricter regulations and restrictions.”); See Chong-En Bai,
supra note 35, at 4 (“The sell-offs of SOE’s were bad for the economy because in order to have a new
owner take over large amounts of debt had to be restructured, often at the states expense.”).
73
See Imai, supra note 47, at 6.
74
See Id., at 7 (“large SOE generally are managed directly by central state agencies and offices who are
better able to sustain the loses of poorly performing corporations and whose goals is more united with the
State in providing social stability by retaining jobs.”).
69
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The governments purposes in promoting SOE’s to be listed on the exchanges
were several. First the state wanted to provide fresh capital to lessen the governments
burden of supporting the SOE’s, many of which were unprofitable or failing.75 Secondly
the state wanted to promote internal corporate governance through securities market
requirements.76
The state is still the largest controlling shareholder of the majority of large firms
in Chinese listed companies. In general for 65.6% of Chinese listed firms a single state
shareholder controls between 20% and 70% of the equity.77 The remaining shareholders
in Chinese listed companies are predominately individual investors.78

ii. SASAC
Another major development in the Chinese capital markets is the consolidation of
state ownership into the SASAC. The SASAC was created from its predecessors in April
2003 to act for the government as the majority shareholder for large SOE’s. It is the

75

See generally Chong-En Bai, supra note 47 (develops the thesis that SOE have been crucial to China’s
developing economy because they are such a large employer and usually the only way the employees have
a social security system. As such SOE have sacrificed market efficiency for social stability. They argue this
is evidenced by the fact SOEs maintained by the central government are less likely to privatize than local
economy’s which are less concerned with social stability).
76
Corporate governance which was not included in the Company Law which governed corporations was
seen by the state as an important way to increase efficiency as well as to attract investors. Since the
Company Law was silent the CSRC stepped in and issued Corporate Governance Guidelines for Listed
Companies.
77
See Howson, supra note 11, at 242 (analyzing data provided by CSRC in 2004).
78
There are no more than 72 million securities trading accountants in China. See China Securities
Depository & Clearing Co., Ltd., available at www.chinaclear.com.cn; But see Joing Deng, Building an
Investor Friendly Shareholder Derivative Lawsuit System in China, 46 Harv. Int’l L.J. 347, 348 fn. 5
(“However there are doubts about the true number of individual investors in Chinas markets because
investors have to open separate accounts on both the Shanghai and Shenzhen market as well as the problem
of institutional and individual investors opening several accounts apiece.”).
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SASAC which creates the regulations controlling the sale of previous NTS’s in the split
share reform and also has final approval on the sale of those shares.79
Initially the SASAC was not authorized to have budgetary control or receive the
profits of the SOE’s which it managed, a position left to the Ministry of Finance.
However, recently the SASAC has been become ever more involved in budgetary and
profit handling functions.80 For example the SASAC created the management Budget
Bureau and an Audit Bureau in early 2005.81 Additionally local branches of the SASAC
have already been given operation control over budgets and/or profit remission in several
cities.82
The goal of the SASAC in the split share reform seems to be in line with the
governments socialist agenda of retaining control over key large sectors of the economy,
while letting smaller SOE’s go.83 The SASAC currently has control over 179 of the
largest SOE’s in China.84 Even though these SOE’s have participated in the split share
reform program the director of SASAC has made it clear that he has no plans to sell off
shares in certain companies.85 Instead the plan seems to be to consolidate the best of them
into larger companies which will dominate their sectors and influence the economy.86

79

Press Release, Embassy of the People’s Republic of China in the Untied States, State Share Reform Not
Selling Out All Shares, June 27, 2006, available at http://www.china-embassy.org/eng/xw/t201442.htm
80
See Chris Buckly, In China, Power to the Center: State Firms Agency Still Calls the Shots, International
Herald Tribune, June 1, 2005, available at http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/05/31/news/sasac.php
(describing how SASAC has shifted and placed senior management in several of the largest companies and
wrestled budget control from others. Also noting that it is at the center of many major economic decisions
which has prompted several multinationals to begin dealing directly with SASAC).
81
Barry Naughton, SASAC Rising, China Leadership Monitor, No. 14 (2005) (citing the Chinese language
article, Wang Shengke, SASAC Redefines Itself, 21 shiji jingji baodao, January 5, 2005. available at,
http://www.nanfangdaily.com.cn/jj/20050106/zh/200501050004.asp.).
82
Id.
83
Id.
84
Number keeps changing and is expected to decrease
85
See Buckly, supra note 80.
86
Id. (“This influence has some economists wondering about the strength of Beijing’s commitment to a
full-blown market economy.”); (“In September last year, the agency's chairman, Li Rongrong, told a
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The role of the SASAC as both a shareholder for the governments assets and an
important player in shaping regulatory policy has begun garnering criticism for the
apparent conflict.87 However, the fact that the SASAC has taken control over large SOE’s
in sectors such as petrochemicals and infrastructure has allowed the agency to show large
profits returned since its inceptions.88 This high profit ratio, since its inception, has
allowed it to withstand the criticism as well as to grab more power from other agencies.
One of the most interesting issues concerning SASAC is its legal position within
the Chinese government. On paper the SASAC is not a public institution such as CSRC
but is rather a “special non-governmental agency reporting directly to its State Council
representatives”.89 In reality however the SASAC is a public institution, mainly because
its passage of regulations and rules governing SOE’s. It’s quasi-public nature is unique
because there is little to no regulation and accountability governing the SASAC
directly.90

IID. Recent Securities Market Reforms
The Chinese Securities markets themselves have undergone a number of
significant reforms in recent years. Before these reforms two of the most distinguishing

conference in Beijing that China must nurture its own multinationals to challenge the dominance of foreign
corporations.” "To accelerate the strategic adjustment of China's economic structure," he said, "we must
vigorously pursue a strategy of creating major corporate conglomerates." Li also said state-owned
companies that were not among the three biggest in their industries would be "restructured," a euphemistic
term for privatization.”).
87
See Buckly, supra note 80; Naughton, supra note 81.
88
See Buckly, supra note 80.
89
See Naughton, supra note 81.
90
Id., (“The SASAC’s legal position is unclear because China has never been able to draft a law governing
control of state assets. A drafting group was established in 1993, but after working through a score of
drafts, it found its final version junked. The group had attempted to write a broad constitutional charter for
the treatment of state assets, but apparently had stumbled into far too many specific problems and conflicts
of interest.”).
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features of the Chinese capital markets were the classification of stocks based on who the
owner was and the rule against trading more than 30% of SOE’s on the market. In recent
years reforms have substantially altered both of these characteristics.
i. Classification of Stocks
One of the most distinguishing features of the Chinese stock market is the
classification of stocks. After the state retained its two-thirds majority of NTS, the
remaining one-third of shares are not only classified on the universal classification as
common stock, preferred stock, etc., but also on the character and nationality of the stock
holder. The characterizations are state shares, legal person shares, A shares and B
shares.91 The origins of this classification are difficult to determine because there is no
mention of it in either the Company Law or the Securities Law.92
State shares are shares held by the central government or its agencies such as local
governments acting on its behalf. These shares were not allowed to be traded on the open
market. Legal Person Shares are shares which are held by a legal person such as another
company or organization with legal person status. Additionally the government can hold
legal person shares through a legal person intermediary such as another SOE. It is
common for these types of shares to be sold when the State is the majority but not sole
owner of the company. While the exact number of these two types of shares is difficult to
ascertain, with official estimates at just over 50 percent and many private estimates at
much higher levels.93
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In addition there are classification of stock depending on which international market they are listed on.
For example shares issued on the Hong Kong Stock Exchange are denominated H shares and stocks listed
on NYSE are denominated N shares.
92
See Wang, supra note 16, at 14.
93
See Imai, supra note 47, at 9. Some sources place the number of state owned shares on the market as high
as 80%.
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A shares are shares that are owned by domestic individual investors and
institutions. These are freely traded on domestic markets and in fact are the most
commonly traded.94 Recently in order to open up its markets to foreign investment, China
has been allowing foreigners to purchase A shares through the Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investor program.95 In order to qualify as a QFII the purchaser must meet
approval from the CSRC which requires the QFII to have very large capital reserves as
well as a long and unblemished reputation. Currently the CSRC has granted QFII status
to approximately 20 foreign institutional investors.96 The other way that foreigners may
purchase A shares is to become strategic investors. Strategic investors must buy a
minimum 10% stake in the company and hold it for a minimum of three years.
B shares are shares which were originally offered to international investors and
not allowed to be sold to domestic investors. In 2001 the government opened the B share
market to allow domestic investors to purchase them with foreign currency.97 These
shares were created in order to obtain foreign currency as well as to demonstrate Chinas
progress in opening its markets to foreign investors.98 They are denominated in Chinese
currency but bought and sold in foreign currency. They are listed on securities exchanges
in China.
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China Securities and Futures, CSRC, 10 (2005) (“As of the end of December 2003, the listed companies
in Mainland China had issued a total of 580.8 billion A shares and raised a total of CNY 761.7 billion. The
market capitalization of A share companies amounted to CNY 4,152.1 billion, of which the market
capitalization of tradable shares was CNY 1,230.6 billion.”).
95
Provisional Measures on Administration of Domestic Securities Investments of Qualified Foreign
Institutional Investors, Joint Decree No. 12 of the CSRC and People’s Bank of China, Nov. 5 2002
Chinas Securities and Futures, CSRC, 5 (2205) For a history of the QFII, see Wang, supra note 16, at 22.
96
See Wang, supra note 16, at 22.
97
CSRC, Circular of the China Securities Regulatory Commission and the State Administration of Foreign
Exchange, Notice on Issues Concerning Individual Domestic Residents’ Investment in Foreign Currency
Stocks Listed in the Domestic Stock Markets, CSRC Decree No. 22 2001.
98
See Wang, supra note 16, at 21 (citing Kejian Chao, Restore the Financing Functions of and Boost the B
Shares Market, Shanghai Securities Daily (Oct. 31 2003) This article appears in Chinese at the website and
I must rely on authors translation.

26

B shares have the same rights to dividends as A shares. However, the market for
these shares remains quite small and since 2001 no company and China has been
authorized to issues B shares in the market.99 As a result A shares are several times more
valuable in the market than B shares.100

ii. Split Share Reform
Generally when a corporation is listed the majority of its stock is placed
on the market and traded. However this would result in lose of state control and
ownership of the states means of production and exchange. In order to retain the socialist
doctrines of state ownership and control over the economy the government restricted the
amount of shares which could be traded of a SOE to one-third of all shares. The
remaining two-thirds of the corporation’s shares were non-tradable shares (NTS). NTS
were issued to promoters, business partners and employees, but the majority were
retaining by the state. In total these NTS accounted for 63% of the total shares in
Chinese capital market as late as February 2006 with the state retaining the majority.101
This is referred to as the split share problem and is discussed below.
In 2005, China initiated the split share reform program in response to growing
discontent about split share program.102 Specifically because non state shareholders were
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Id.
See Beltratti and Bortolotti, The Nont-radable Share Reform in the Chinese Stock Market, Noomura
Institute (April 2006).
101
Id.
102
See ChinaDaily.com, Poor Governance Blamed for Securities Markets, June 20, 2006,
http://www.chinadaily.com.cn/english/doc/2005-04/03/content_430562.htmBy 2003 (“A recent survey by
a Shanghai-based investment consultancy firm shows that at least 70 percent institutional investors and 90
percent minority share holders believe that the split share structure should be given top priority by the
leadership when they consider ways to revive the market. In January 2004 the Chinese government
officially acknowledged that NTS were a problem with ongoing market reform and committed itself to
solving the problem.
100
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regulated to being minority shareholders there was increasing concerning that there was
no way in which to institute corporate governance reforms or effectively monitor actions
by the corporations.103 This was viewed as one of the main reasons for Chinese capital
markets poor performance between 2001-2005 despite a rapidly growing economy.104
The reform essentially allows all previously non-tradable state-owned shares to be
traded on the markets and all future IPO’s to have entirely tradable shares.105 Due to
concerns about downward pressure on the market and loss of value to existing
shareholders from the large amount of new stock being placed in the market the reform
calls for majority state shareholders to negotiate some form of acceptable compensation
to minority shareholders for the loss in value of their stock.106 In effect the shareholders
of the companies themselves draw up the reform plan which is then approved by
regulators. In order for the plan to proceed the public shareholders must approve it by a
two-thirds vote. While this negotiation is occurring the issuance of shares and IPO’s is
frozen in order to prevent misconduct and sell-offs. Additionally, the majority
shareholder is very limited in the amount of stock that they can sell in the market in the
first two years after the reform.
The split share reform program was initiated through three phases. The reform
was initiated by a two trial runs involving 4 companies in April 2005 and than 42
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See Beltratti, supra note 100, at 2 (“In addition major NTS shareholders were impervious to market
conditions due to the fact it was impossible to sell. Also the small free float made the market more illiquid
and prone to manipulation.”).
104
An additional view is that the lack of corporate governance in general was what caused the decline.
105
See Beltratti, note 100, at 3 (noting that two previous attempts to make NTS tradeable had failed prior to
this reform. One in 1999 which was an experiment involving only 2 companies was not well received by
investors, and one in 2001 which failed because the government priced the tradeable and non-tradable
shares equally).
106
See Id. (“This negotiation between the NTS majority shareholders and minority shareholders is the
distinguishing feature between the current reforms and previous failed attempts at reducing NTS shares. It
is in fact quite innovative because it replaces the usual top down reform program initiated by the state.”).
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companies in June 2005 which account for 10% of the stock market.107 On August 24,
2005 the government extended the reform program to all companies with publicly listed
stock. To date over 60 percent of publicly listed SOE’s have participated in the reform.108
Reforms in stock classification and non-tradeable shares have significantly altered
the investment environment in Chinese capital markets. The QFII reform as well as
others has increased international participation in Chinese capital markets. In addition the
creation of the SASAC has introduced a powerful player into the market which will have
significant influence over the Chinese economy in future years. These reforms aid in
making China more competitive in the international market. The next section examines
this competitive position and also some of the ways that China is using it.

IIE. China’s Power in the International Market and Use Thereof.
China has become an economic powerhouse on the international level. Adjusting
for purchasing power differentials, China is already the world's second largest economy.
Growing at a faster clip than any other major nation, it is on course to surpass the United
States as the world's largest economy within two decades.109
In many industries, especially those that are labor intensive, China is by now the
dominant global player. China-based factories make 70 percent of the world's toys, 60
percent of its bicycles, half its shoes, and one-third of its luggage. In those product
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Id.
China Daily, Split Share Reform, (March 2006) available at:
http://www.china.org.cn/english/BAT/156140.htm (“As of Jan 20, 2006. 462 companies had participated
in the reform, of these 284 were local SOE and 46 were central SOE’s.”).
109
See ODED SHENKAR, CHINESE CENTURY: THE RISING CHINESE ECONOMY AND ITS IMPACT ON THE
GLOBAL ECONOMY, THE BALANCE OF POWER, AND YOUR JOB, (2005) (these quotes are taken out of an
online article promoting the book itself, available at:
http://www.whartonsp.com/articles/article.asp?p=345008&rl=1).
108
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categories, it is often impossible to find a non-Chinese product on store shelves.110 This
drive for exporting is fueled by the need for growth in China’s economy.111
China’s importance in the global economy has by now surpassed most of the
other members of the G-8.112 It huge effect on global supply and demand is now rivaled
only by the US.113 As China competes with the US for superpower strength it has become
a major creditor of the US holding hundreds of billions of dollars in US securities.114 This
creditor status is likely to have a large strategic impact on Chinese-US relations.115
China’s heavy economic clout in the global market has also given it the ability to
become powerful politically.116 China’s huge trade deals with other countries have given
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Id.
Id. China is still less reliant on exports than many other countries in Asia (such as Malaysia) and outside
(such as Belgium), but its dependence is growing, and the export drive must continue for it to fund its
growing imports of capital goods and production inputs and prevent a social and political time bomb from
exploding, with unemployment serving as the trigger. Not only does China need to provide jobs to a huge
cohort of young people, but it also must worry about the many millions still employed in money-losing
state enterprises and the 100–200 million people who have left the countryside in search of work in urban
areas and who would be the first to be affected by a serious economic downturn. Disaffected peasants have
been a source of rebellion throughout Chinese history, and economic well-being is especially critical to a
regime that has shed its ideological base and now relies on economic prosperity and nationalism as its sole
sources of legitimacy.
112
Jeffrey E. Garten, China: The Missing Member at the G-8 Table, YaleGlobal, (June 2004) available at:
http://yaleglobal.yale.edu/display.article?id=4023 (“China has become far more important to the global
economy than most other G-8 members such as Italy, Canada and even France.”).
113
Id. (“China has become a major player in international finance. It receives more direct foreign
investment than any nation but the US. It possesses more foreign exchange reserves than any country
besides Japan. Next to the US, China has more impact on global supply and demand than any other
country. Indeed, China is becoming as central to global manufacturing as Saudi Arabia is to oil.”).
114
Id.( “Beijing has become a critical creditor to Uncle Sam, holding hundreds of billions of dollars of U.S.
government securities.”).
115
Id. (“How it uses this leverage ought to be of major concern to Washington and Wall Street, and to
anyone – such as home owners, car purchasers, or average investors – who is affected by interest rates or
the value of the dollar.”) Keith Bradsher, Failed Unocal Bid Unlikely to Halt China’s Plans, New York
Times (August 3, 2005) available at: http://www.iht.com/articles/2005/08/02/business/chioil.php (“The
Chinese government still has $711 billion in foreign currency reserves that need to be invested. The
reserves are mostly parked in Treasuries, American mortgage-backed securities and a mishmash of other
financial instruments earning a meager return that has become controversial within China.”).
116
There are also economically related human rights concerns, See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 185
(“critics fear…China is likely to take advantage of its growing economic and geopolitical influence to
defend and advocate rights policies and a normative vision of the world at odds with current rights policies
based on secular liberalism”.).
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China enormous clout in such organizations as the UN and WTO.117 It is predicted that
China will continue to increase strategic alliances with allies such as India and Brazil to
create a powerful political alliance that would have the power to significantly affect all
aspects of the global economy.118
China is using its economic clout to major deals on the international level. In one
area in particular, the pursuit of oil, China is brokering enormous deals throughout the
world. Normally this would not be an expected move. However, China is pursuing these
deals with terrorist supporting countries like Iran and Sudan. This seems to suggest that
China is not interested in becoming a responsible member of the international economic
community.

i. China Deal with Iran
China has recently established strong long economic term ties to Iran.119 These
ties are primary based on China’s growing need for vast amounts of foreign oil and a
thriving export market in Iran for Chinese goods.120 However, China has not been
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See Garten, supra note 112 (“China’s ties to other emerging markets such as Brazil and India may also
alter the course of global politics.”).
118
Id. (“A political bloc of big developing countries could have enormous influence in the World Trade
Organization, for example. There is a good chance that such a group will emerge, and under Chinese
leadership.”).
119
Id. (China has recently signed a $70 billion dollar oil and natural gas deal with Iran that will operate for
the next 20 years at least.)
120
Robin Wright, Iran’s New Alliance With China Could Cost U.S. Leverage, Washington Post (November
17, 2004) available at http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A55414-2004Nov16.html (“An oil
exporter until 1993, China now produces only for domestic use. Its proven oil reserves could be depleted in
14 years, oil analysts say, so the country is aggressively trying to secure future suppliers. Iran is now
China's second-largest source of imported oil.”).
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content to just buy oil, increasingly China has become involved in large amounts of arms
sales to Iran.121
China’s economic ties to Iran have grown into a powerful strategic alliance. China
has become a large obstacle to effectively dealing with Iran in the UN.122 In addition,
China’s relationship with Iran is making it harder for the sanctions that Western countries
impose on Iran to have an impact.123 China’s disregard for the reasons why Iran is
considered a threat is likely based on its own history of not being considered a
responsible world power.124
ii. China Deals with Sudan
China’s quest for oil has also led it to develop strong ties with Sudan and aid the
Sudanese government in the genocide of Darfur.125 Sudan is China’s largest overseas oil
project and also Sudan’s largest supplier of arms.126 China’s has protected it’s investment
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Id. (“Accurate trade figures are difficult to get, in part because trade is increasing so rapidly and partly
because China's large arms sales to Iran are not included or publicized. But at the second annual Iran-China
trade fair here in May, Chinese Vice Minister of Commerce Gao Hucheng said trade had increased by 50
percent in 2003 over the previous year, according to the Islamic Republic News Agency. Beijing has also
provided Iran with advanced military technology, including missile technology, U.S. officials say. In April
2004, the Bush administration imposed sanctions on Chinese manufacturers of equipment that can be used
to develop weapons of mass destruction.”).
122

Id. (“Holding a veto at the U.N. Security Council, China has become the key obstacle to putting
international pressure on Iran.”).
123
Id. (“China's trade with Iran is weakening the impact on Iranian policy of various U.S. economic
embargoes, analysts here say. "Sanctions are not effective nowadays because we have many options in
secondary markets, like China," said Hossein Shariatmadari, a leading conservative theorist and editor of
the Kayhan newspapers.”).
124

Id. (“The Iran-China ties may be partly a response to the United States, analysts here say. President
Bush's strategy has been to contain both China and the Islamic republic, said Siamak Namazi, a political
and economic analyst, "so that's created natural allies." But today, China with its one-party political system
appears to feel fewer restraints than do Western nations in dealing with the world's only theocracy. "For
China, issues like human rights don't affect your relations with Iran," Namazi said.”).
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Peter S. Goodman, China Invests Heavily in Sudan’s Oil Industry: Beijing Supplies Arms Used on
Villagers, Washington Post (December 23, 2004) available at:
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by seeking protection of its assets from the same government that is responsible for the
genocide.127 This relationship has prolonged the genocide in Sudan because China has
used its strong position on the UN to block effective resolution of the genocide.128

iii. China Attempts to Deal with the US: Unocal
In 2005 CNOOC oil company, a SOE of the Chinese government, made a $18.5
billion dollar bid to buy US based Unocal oil company.129 However US congress and
presidential resistance to the deal forced the Chinese to withdrawal their offer.130 The US

http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/articles/A21143-2004Dec22.html (“China National Petroleum
Corp., still owned by the Communist Party government, bought into the Sudan consortium in 1996. It
joined with Sudan's Energy Ministry to build the country's largest refinery, then last year invested in a $300
million expansion that nearly doubled production, according to a report in the Shenzhen Business Post.”).
126
Id. (“Sudan is China's largest overseas oil project. China is Sudan's largest supplier of arms, according to
a former Sudan government minister. Chinese-made tanks, fighter planes, bombers, helicopters, machine
guns and rocket-propelled grenades have intensified Sudan's two-decade-old north-south civil war.”).
127
Id. (“For years, the rebels have attacked oil installations, seeking to deprive the Sudan government of the
wherewithal to pursue a civil war that has killed more than 2 million people and displaced 4 million from
their homes over the past two decades. But the Chinese laborers are protected: They work under the
vigilant gaze of Sudanese government troops armed largely with Chinese-made weapons -- a partnership of
the world's fastest-growing oil consumer with a pariah state accused of fostering genocide in its western
Darfur region.” And “A recent report in the state-controlled China Business News quotes a Chinese foreign
affairs official as saying that Beijing has asked Khartoum to "send troops" to areas in which Chinese
companies operate.”).
128
Id. (“From its seat on the United Nations Security Council, China has been Sudan's chief diplomatic
ally. In recent months, the council has neared votes on a series of resolutions aimed at pressuring Sudan's
predominantly Arab government to protect the African tribes under attack in Darfur and stop support for
militias by threatening to sanction its oil sales. China has threatened to veto such actions while watering
down the threat of oil sanctions.
129
See Ben White, Chinese Drop Bid to Buy US Oil Firm, Washington Post (August 3, 2005) (“Cnooc
(pronounced SEA-nook), which is the Hong Kong listed unit of its state-owned parent, China National
Offshore Oil Corp, was stung. The state owns 70 percent of CNOOC.”).
Shai Oster, China’s CNOOC learns from Unocal Uproar, Wall Street Journal. Available at:
http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/chinas-cnooc-learns-from-unocaluproar/n20060731112009990005?cid=403
130

Id. “Chinese oil company Cnooc Ltd. on Tuesday withdrew its $18.5 billion takeover bid for California
energy firm Unocal Corp., saying it could not overcome resistance from politicians in Washington who said
such a deal could threaten U.S. national security and violate the rules of fair trade.” See Bradsher, supra
note 115 (“The sight of a Chinese company trying to buy a company once known for the 76 brand made the
proposed deal a lightning rod for American worries about everything from manufacturing job losses to high
oil prices to the security of energy supplies. But while U.S. congressional resistance appears to have
torpedoed the Chinese bid, the economic fundamentals behind that bid remain in place, from China's vast
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concerns were based on loss of jobs, high oil prices and national security.131 The Chinese
found themselves shocked by the US resistance as the Chinese government had gone to
great lengths to publicize the deal as a strictly commercial one.132
CNOOC’s chairman was adamant that the deal was a strictly commercial one and
that the Chinese government had no connection to the deal.133 Executives emphasizing
that the government did not control the decisions of the CNOOC board and were merely
a shareholder.134 However in order to make the financing work CNOOC borrowed nearly

foreign currency reserves to its ravenous appetite for imported oil.”). See White, supra note 129 (“But the
sources said Cnooc Chairman Fu Chengyu and other executives and directors were shocked by the intensity
of the negative reaction from Congress and by signals that the administration did not want to decide
whether to accept or reject Cnooc's bid. The president has final authority to accept or reject such deals.”).
131

Bradsher, supra note 115.
Id. “The most immediate effect from the failed bid may be on Chinese public opinion toward the United
States. China's state-controlled media had devoted extensive coverage to the Cnooc bid and presented it to
the public as an exclusively commercial arrangement” “"This is a very symbolic deal that made Chinese
people proud of themselves," said Jin Canrong, associate dean of the School of International Studies at
People's University. "Definitely they will feel some kind of disappointment.”).
133
Shai Oster, China’s CNOOC learns from Unocal Uproar, Wall Street Journal. Available at:
http://money.aol.com/news/articles/_a/chinas-cnooc-learns-from-unocaluproar/n20060731112009990005?cid=403 (the following are excerts interview with Mr. Fu who is the
Chairman of CNOOC.)
(“WSJ: How is Cnooc different from other major state-owned oil companies and enterprises?
Mr. Fu: We get no financial support from the state. We, the company and the board, are responsible for all
the decisions we took, for all the financial results or consequences - not the government.
WSJ: Did you get any cheap loans from the state or other funding?
Mr. Fu: The government did not finance even one cent. All the money we used would be from commercial
loans, most of them from our U.S. companies, issuance of new shares and partially from our parent.”).
134
Id.
(“WSJ: I have to challenge you on that. Your biggest stakeholder is the state.
Mr. Fu: Whatever the percentage, they are all shareholders. As long as I can deliver good value to
shareholders they are happy.
WSJ: But the government is the largest shareholder.
Mr. Fu: When I say the government is a shareholder, it's not just because they are largest, also because they
are not interfering with out daily operations. They are not important in decision making on how we run this
company. Our management is the same as any other company in the market.
WSJ: So, who does make the final investment decisions at Cnooc?
Mr. Fu: The final approval is by our board, not by the government.”).
132
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$6 billion from a large state owned bank, which had just recently received a large influx
of government cash.135
These three deals show that while China’s SOE’s may appear to be pursuing
legitimate government interests there is in fact a large degree of state involvement
involved in these SOE’s as evidenced by the Chinese governments involvement at a
political level to support them. These deals illustrate one form of how the Chinese
government is willing to support SOE’s in a competitive global market in order to further
its national interest. It is easy to image that the Chinese government supports its SOE’s in
the competitive domestic market in the same kinds of ways.

Part III: Laws Affecting Investment in China’s Domestic Markets
This Part examines various aspects of the Chinese legal framework governing
capital markets. In particular it focuses on various the protections offered under Chinese
laws against various market manipulations and breaches of fiduciary duties. In addition
this part focuses on some of the laws affecting SOE’s in the marketplace. Finally there is
a brief discussion concerning WTO laws which could be construed to affect Chinese
domestic capital markets. In order to place the Chinese legal framework in context this
section outlines the structure of the Chinese government and its relations to the judiciary.

Part IIIA: Structure of Government Under Constitution
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Bradsher, supra note 115 (“A Cnooc deal could have provided another investment opportunity; the
government announced in late spring that it would inject $15 billion into a big state-owned bank, which in
turn agreed to lend $6 billion for the Cnooc bid. Jin Canrong, associate dean of the School of International
Studies at People's University. said that the State Administration of Foreign Exchange would continue
managing the reserves with an eye to maximizing the return on them.”).
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The Chinese Government is a hierarchical government established and run by the
Chinese Communist Party.136 The Chinese Communist Party is the sole party with any
real authority within the Chinese Government.137 While not required, nearly all members
of government are members of the CCP.138 Therefore the CCP has complete control over
all aspects of the central government.
The National Peoples Congress is by name the supreme organ of power in the
Chinese government.139 However the NPC meets only once a year for a few weeks and
essentially approves the actions of the real organ of power in Chinese politics, the
Standing Committee of the NPC. The Standing Committee which is composed of
powerful member of the CCP includes the president and premier and is the permanent
role of the NCP exercising nearly all of its powers.140
Subordinate to the Standing Committee are the major organs of administration,
judicial, and military power. The State Council is the highest administrative party with
broad administrative powers exercised subserviently to the Standing Committee.141
Below the State Council are the various Ministries such as the Minister of Finance and
the SASAC.142
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China’s Constitution which was formulated by the CCP and structures the government in such a way
that the CCP is the primary authority in government usually acting through the Standing Committee.
137
See infra footnotes, 25-27 and accompanying text
138
Id.
139
Constitution Article 57 (naming the NPC the “highest organ of state power).
140
Constitution Article 57 (naming the Standing Committee as the permanent body of the NPC).
Constitution Article 67 (gives the Standing Committee nearly all of the power of the NPC including
interpreting and enforcing the Constitution, enacting, amending, and interpreting laws and supervising the
State Council, CMC and Supreme Court).
141
Constitution Article 85, (naming State Council as “highest organ of state administration). Constitution
Article 89 (giving State Council power to adopt administrative rules, control Ministries, and direct some
economic affairs). Constitution Article 92 (making State Council responsible to NPC and Standing
Committee).
142
Constitution Article 89(3).
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Equally powerful to the State Council are the Supreme People’s Court and the
Central Military Commission. The Supreme People’s Court while guaranteed
independence in the constitution, is in fact responsible to the Standing Committee.143 The
CMC is a very powerful force in China and is considered crucial to the Standing
Committee in order to exercise power and maintain domestic stability.144
Local governments are modeled similarly to the central NPC and are broken down
into provinces, municipalities, counties, cities, etc.145 Their power is based on a hierarchy
within the government.146 Large local governments elect members to serve as delegates
to the NPC, thus in theory obtaining equal representation before the Central
Government.147 Thus the enforcement of laws in China, by both the courts and regulatory
bodies occurs within a highly hierarchical political framework, as opposed to separate
from the political framework as occurs in most Western democracies.

Part IIIB: Chinese Courts
Chinese courts tend to be limited in their powers by largely non-legal concerns.
Politically, the Constitution which gives the Standing Committee the power to supervise
the courts has been interpreted by the Standing Committee to give it the authority to
supervise final judicial decisions.148
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Constitution Article 126 (“in accordance with the law exercise judicial power independently and are not
subject to interference by administrative organs, public organizations, or individuals.”) Constitution Article
128, (“The Supreme People’s Courts is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee.”).
144
Constitution Article 94 (the CMC is responsible to the NPC and its Standing Committee).
145
Constitution Article 95.
146
Id.
147
Id.
148
See Peerenboom, supra note 15 at 218.
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Chinese courts operate under the civil law tradition and therefore generally do
not allow for judge made law.149 Under this civil law system it is the local and central
governments that largely provide the law which Chinese courts are forced to follow.
Chinese courts invoke a very limited power to interpret legislation. Courts are not
allowed to strike down even administrative regulations because they are unconstitutional
or inconsistent with a higher level court holding.150 The only option the courts can seek is
to apply a higher level law or administrative decision.151
In addition governments at the same level as the courts exert budgetary and
appointment powers over the courts.152 These appointment powers include appointing
judges to the courts and the control over there promotion.153 Additionally government
adjudication committees oversee the courts and can influence the decisions of courts in
some cases.154 It is within these limited political constraints that the Chinese courts
decide cases involving Security Law violations.

Part IIIC: Insider Trading and Market Manipulation
In general, insider trading and market manipulation are illegal under the laws of
China.155 The primary law governing these activities is the Securities Law of the People’s
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However do to increasing publication of important or sensitive cases and judicial comments in China
there is a inevitable degree of precedent in interpretation. See generally Hutchens, supra note 7, at fn. 84
and 85 (which while citing some of the numerous articles dealing with the problems of the civil law
tradition in China, also notes that in particularly publication of cases in the Supreme People’s Court have
begun to have a precedent value).
150
See Peerenboom, supra note 15, at 219.
151
Id.
152
See Hutchens, supra note 7 at 621 (“For examples, the Qingdao People’s congress controls the budget
and personnel of the Qingdao People’s Courts.”)
153
Id. at 643.
154
Id. at 621.
155
Securities Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the 6th Meeting of the Standing
Committee of the Ninth National People’s Congress on December 29, 1989. Article 5.
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Republic of China.156 The Securities Law is premised on the fact that all parties involved
in the trading of securities have equal legal statutes and must adhere to the principles of
voluntariness, compensation and good faith.157
Insider trading is the where persons with knowledge of material inside
information on securities trading take advantage of such inside information to engage in
securities trading.158 Market manipulation is generally manipulating the trading prices of
share through unfair means such as carrying out combined or successive purchases to
build an advantage or selling to oneself or another acting on one’s behalf.159
Persons with knowledge of inside information include directors, supervisor, and
managers of companies as well as members of the securities regulatory authority and
other public intermediary organizations that participate in securities trading pursuant to
duty.160
The Securities Law prohibits certain members of the government from holding,
purchasing, and selling shares.161 These government members include staff members of
the securities regulatory authority and employees and of stock exchanges and securities
registration and clearing institutions.162 Generally State-owned enterprises and enterprises
where State-owned assets constitute a controlling interest may not speculate in listed
shares.163 Due to the lack of the courts interpretive powers it is unclear whether they
interpret the definitions of insider and inside information to government officials such as
the SASAC from trading on political or economic information.
156

Id.
Securities Law, Article 4
158
Securities Law, Article 67
159
Securities Law, Article 71
160
Securities Law, Article 68
161
Securities Law, Article 37
162
Id.
163
Securities Law, Article 76
157
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Part IIID: Fiduciary Duties
Chinese law lacks a comprehensive definition of the fiduciary duties (duty of care
and duty of loyalty) for directors, officers, board members, and controlling shareholders
in either the Security Law or the Company Law. The Company law does have some
articulation of these duties, however they are frequently described as weak and
fragmentary.164
The description of fiduciary duty is found in Article 59 the Company Law which
states that “directors, supervisor, or the general manager shall abide by the articles of
association, faithfully perform their duties, and safeguard the interests of the company,
and may not abuse their positions and authorities at the company for private gain.”165
There is also a duty of loyalty found in Article 61 of the Company Law which
states that “A director or the general manager may not engage in the same business as the
company in which he serves as a director or the general manager either for his own
account or for any other person's account, or engage in any activity detrimental to
company interests.”166 This is followed in Article 62 by a duty not to disclose
confidential information unless required by law or consented to by the shareholders
committee.167
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See Company Law arts. 57-63.
Company Law Art. 59.
166
Company Law Art. 61.
167
Company Law Art. 62.
165
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The Company Law also makes the director, supervisor or general manager
personally liable for causing detriment to the company in violation of any national
statute, administrative regulation, or the articles of association.168

i. The Code of Corporate Governance
In 2002, the CSRC issued the Code of Corporate Governance for Listed
Companies in China. The Code is applicable to all listed companies in China.169
Companies must incorporate the requirements of the Code in their Articles of
Association, or when they amend them.170 Listed companies are required to act in the
spirit of the Code and if the CSRC determines that a company’s corporate governance
structure has major problems it may instruct the Company to make corrections.171
One of the most important aspects of the Governance Code is rules governing the
behavior of controlling shareholders. The Governance Code specifically states that the
controlling shareholders have a “duty of good faith” towards the listed company and to
the other shareholders. 172 The controlling shareholder is required to strictly observe laws
and not allowed to harm the interest of the company through asset restructuring or
seeking personal gain.173 In addition, the controlling shareholder, prior to listing the

168

Company Law Art. 64.
Code of Corporate Governance for Listed Companies in China, CSRC, preface. Available at
www.csrc.gov.cn.
170
Id. (“Requirements of the Code shall be embodied when listed companies formulate or amend their
articles of association or rules of governance.”) It is not clear if companies which have already filed their
Articles of Association prior to the 2002 issuance of the Code are required to embody the principles of the
Code. If not than this leaves a vast number of companies in China that are not bound by the Code.
171
Id. This language seems to clearly indicate that breaches of the Code that are not otherwise violations of
the Securities Laws and Company Law will not be subject to real enforcement such as penalties,
imprisonment, or civil liability.
172
Governance Code, section 19.
173
Id.
169
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company, must sever its social functions from the company such as stripping out nonoperational assets and welfare institutions.174
The Governance Code also describes several duty of loyalty type provisions for
controlling shareholders. A controlling shareholder who owns other business or
institutions that provide services to the listed company must act in accordance with
commercial principles.175 More specifically:
“A listed company's business shall be completely independent from that of its controlling
shareholders. Controlling shareholders and their subsidiaries shall not engage in the same
or similar business as that of the listed company. Controlling shareholders shall adopt
efficient measures to avoid competition with the listed company.”176
The Governance Code also contains several provisions on the independence of
controlling shareholders. The controlling shareholder shall not directly or indirectly
interfere with the company’s decisions or business activities.177 More specifically:
“A listed company shall be separated from its controlling shareholders in such aspects as
personnel, assets and financial affairs, shall be independent in institution and business,
shall practice independent business accounting, and shall independently bear risks and
obligations.”178
The Governance Code also addresses related party transactions. These are not
defined in the Governance Code except calling them connected parties, but it is likely to
include companies which have an overlap of owners.179 When related party transactions
occur they must be in writing and describe the transactions in specific and concrete
terms.180 The related party transactions must observe the principles of equality,
174

Governance Code, section 16.
Governance Code, section 17.
176
Governance Code, section 27.
177
Governance Code. section 21.
178
Governance Code, section 22.
179
Governance Code, section 12.
180
Id.
175
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voluntarily, and making compensation for equal value.181 Measures must be taken by the
listed company in prevent the connected party from harming the listed company by
monopolizing purchase or sales channels.182 The prices in the transaction must conform
to independent third party prices.183

Part IIIE: Private Securities Litigation
Until recently Chinese Courts refused to accept private securities litigation claims.
This was despite the fact that there was some legal basis for the filing of such claims.184
In fact courts were faced with several securities litigation cases but simply refused to hear
them.185
In September of 2001 the SPC issued a notice which placed a temporary ban on
all private securities litigation suits.186 In early 2003 the SCP released the ban in a limited
way when it issued Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil
Compensation Based upon Misrepresentation.(PSL Rules).187
The PSL rules create a systematic framework for private securities litigation
concerning misrepresentation or false disclosure. The PSL Rules address several issues
concerning both the substance and procedure for private litigants bring a claim for
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Id.
Governance Code, Section 13.
183
Id.
184
Securities Law, Article 63 (provides a basis for civil liability for disclosure fraud.) In addition the
General Principles of Civil Law of the People’s Republic of China Art. 213 (provide that tort victim are
entitled to civil compensation).And CSRC, Notice on Issuing the Guideline on the Management of Listed
Companies Art. 4.
185
See generally Hutchens, supra note 7, at footnote 17.
186
Supreme People’s Court, Notice Concerning Temporarily Not Accepting Civil Compensation Cases
Related to Securities, September 21, 2001.
187
Supreme People’s Court, Several Regulations Concerning the Adjudication of Civil Compensation
Securities Cases Based upon Misrepresentation, Jan, 9 2003.
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misrepresentation including who has standing, definition of the tort, statute of limitation,
evidence requirements, and jurisdiction.188
Under the PSL Rules Misrepresentations are defined as outright false statements,
misleading statements, and material omission.189 The PSL however has important
limitations on the scope of the tort. For instance plaintiffs may not recover when they buy
a security prior to false disclosure and sell it prior to the time that the false disclosure is
made public.190

i. PSL and Insider Information
The PSL rules limit private securities litigation to case for misrepresentation. The
2001 ban on private causes of action remains in effect for insider trading and market
manipulation cases.191 In fact. courts hearing cases of misrepresentation must separate
damages caused by insider trading and market manipulation from those caused by
misrepresentation and only allow for recover of damages caused by misrepresentation.192

ii. PSL and the Government Enabling Requirement
The PSL Rules require that before any private securities litigation suit may be
brought in Chinese Courts there must be a prior administrative penalty or criminal
penalty imposed on the defendant.193 This is referred to as the requirement of enabling
government action. The requirement does not have a basis in any Chinese law concerning
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Id.
PSL Rules, Art. 17.
190
PSL Rules, Art. 19.
191
See Wei, supra note 14, at 140.
192
Id.
193
PSL Rules, Art. 6.
189
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securities but is rather more like a judge made legislation. This requirement can be met
by a Chinese Court or any administrative agency with jurisdiction not just the CSRC.194
Therefore there is a powerful government controlled gatekeeper on private securities
litigation in Chinese courts.

Part IIIF. Laws Governing SOE’s in the Market.
This section examines the laws effecting SOE’s in the Chinese capital markets.
Specifically it will focus on the laws affecting SASAC since they are likely to become
the most influential players in the capital market. However, prior to discussing the these
laws it will be useful to provide a brief background into the legal basis of state ownership
in China.
i. Legal Basis of State Ownership
China’s Constitution strongly commits it is to socialist ideal of public ownership
of the means of production.195 The Constitution names public ownership as the dominant
force in the socialist economy and committees the State to ensuring the consolidation and
growth of the State-owned economy.196
The Constitution also recognizes private economies as major components of the
socialist market economy.197 The State pledges itself to the protection of private sectors
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of the economy and encourages, supports and guides their development.198 The
Constitution also acknowledges private property as inviolable and commits the State to
private property protection.199 The State may like many countries exercise eminent
domain in the public interest provided it makes compensation.200

ii. Laws Affecting State Owned Assets
The organization with direct control over the most important state owned assets is
the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission (SASAC). The
primary law governing the SASAC is the Interim Regulations on Supervision and
Management of State-owned Assets of Enterprises, which was adopted by the State
Council in May of 2003.201 Under this law the SASAC is directly subordinate to the State
Council and performs its functions on its behalf.202
The SASAC was established to “suit the needs of the socialist market economy,
better run State-owned enterprises, push forward the strategic adjustment of the layout
and structure of the State economy, develop and expand the State economy, and realize
the preservation of and increase the value of State-owned assets”.203 The SASAC
therefore has traditional investor objectives as well as non-investor State objectives.

iii. SASAC as Investor
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A number of provisions of the SASAC Regulation make the SASAC conform to
traditional investor objectives. The Regulations state that the SASAC shall not interfere
with the independence of State-owned enterprise apart from performing the
responsibilities of investor.204 In addition, The SASAC is to eliminate the functions of
social and public administration formally assumed by the Peoples governments in their
management of State-owned assets of enterprises.205
The rights and responsibilities of the investor to which the SASAC must conform
are set forth in the Company Law of China. These rights and responsibilities include
enjoy capital gains, taking part in major policy decisions and choosing managers in
proportion to share of the investment they make in the company.206

iv. SASAC as More Than Investor
In addition to performing the responsibilities of the typical investor the SASAC
performs several additional functions. The SASAC has the power to formulate laws and
regulations on its own which effect its management and the management by others in
SOE’s.207 The SASAC has the power to broadly audit the financial and strategic positions
of each of its state invested enterprises.208 The SASAC has the power to dispatch
supervisory panels to the invested enterprises and punish and reward responsible persons
204
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in the invested enterprise.209 It also has the authority to “undertake other tasks assigned to
it by the government of the corresponding level”.210
The SASAC has obligations in regard to state invested enterprises which
supersede those of a typical investor. Such obligations include promoting the reasonable
flow and optimized allocation of State-owned assets211, propel the adjustment of the
layout and structure of the State economy212, and maintain and improve the controlling
power and competitive power of the State economy in areas which have a vital bearing
on the lifeline of the national economy and State security213. In general SASAC has the
obligation to improve the overall quality of the State economy214.
It may accomplish these goals by offering “guidance and coordination” to State
invested enterprises in “overcoming difficulties and solving problems” in their reform
and development.215 In the event of wars, serous natural calamities or other “major and
emergent situations”, the SASAC may uniformly reallocate and dispose State-owned
assets of enterprises.216 These objectives obviously go beyond the privileges and
responsibilities of the traditional investor.
To shift gears a bit, the next section deals with the WTO. Considering the degree
to which the Chinese government both directly and indirectly plays a role in the Chinese
domestic markets it is necessary to determine whether its membership in the WTO
subjects it to restrictions on that involvement.
209
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Part IIIG. WTO Rules on Subsidies
One of the main goals of the WTO is to promote fair international trade by
prohibiting member countries from granting subsidies to industries in their country. The
major rules governing subsidies of WTO members is the Agreement on Subsidies and
Countervailing Measures (SCM Agreement)217, which acts to supplement the General
Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT)218. In addition, the China Ascension Protocol
contains several China specific rules concerning government subsidies for SOE’s.219
Under WTO law a subsidy exists if there is a financial contribution by a
government and a benefit is therefore conferred.220 A ‘financial contribution’ by the
government includes direct transfers of money (grants, loans, or loan guarantees), noncollection of money owned to the government (e.g. tax credits), goods or services
provided by the government other than infrastructure, or purchase of goods by the
government.221 In addition if a government provides funds for or entrusts a private body
to engage in any of these financial contributions ‘which would normally be vested in the
government and the practice, in no real sense, differs from practices normally followed
by governments’ it is considered a financial contribution by the government.222
WTO is concerned primary with international trade in the import and export
markets. The rules under GATT deal with subsidies generally as any form of income or
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price support which operates directly or indirectly to increase any exports from the
country or decrease any imports into its country.223
There are generally two relevant exceptions to the subsidy prohibitions under the
WTO agreement. They are the for subsidies granted by a developing country member in
connection with a privatization program224 and those used by a transition economy
member to facilitate its transformation from a centrally planned into a market
economy.225
However, under the China Protocol, China may not take advantage of the
privatization exception.226 The transition exception also does not apply to China because
it allows for a 7 year period to phase out such subsidies, a deadline which has already
expired for China.227 Therefore there are no major exceptions under the WTO exempting
China from government subsidies.
Under GATT if a state enterprise or governments grants any exclusive or special
privilege to an enterprise, such enterprises are required to make all sales and purchases of
goods soley in accordance with non-discriminatory commercial considerations.228
However there is a general provision for non-disclosure of confidential information if
such information is contrary to public interest or would prejudice the legitimate
commercial interests of particular enterprises.229
The China Protocol however does include many China specific rules which were
developed in the Report of the Working Party on the Accession of China and
223
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incorporated into the China Protocol. The Protocol prevents SOE’s from making
purchases and sales on anything other than commercial considerations.230 China must
also ensure that other WTO members are allowed to compete in the market under nondiscriminatory basis.231 Further, the Government of China would not influence, directly
or indirectly, commercial decisions on the part of SOE’s.232
China must apply and administer all laws and regulations affecting trade in a
uniform, impartial and reasonable manner.233 Foreign individuals and enterprises must be
accorded treatment no less favorable than any others on the prices and availability of
goods and services supplied by public and state enterprises.234

Part IV: Towards a New Paradigm and its Implications

Part IVA: Application of Facts and Law
In order to satisfy its citizens and thus retain its power the CCP is necessarily
becoming increasingly concerned with wealth. It may be argued that this pragmatic
approach may be the best way for China to proceed in order to ensure social stability.235
It does not take much to envision the human travesty that would occur if wide scale social
instability broke out in China due to botched market reforms. Along the same line it’s
important for China and the world to prevent China from becoming an arguably failed
capitalist state like Russia.
230
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However, the money that the CCP needs to prevent this social instability is in
large part generated through international trade, domestic markets, and foreign direct and
indirect investment. When China competes with other countries in the global market
there will surely be losers if China does not play fair. Therefore while the pragmatic
approach may be the most efficient for China it could have seriously unfair effects on
competing countries.
i. China’s Domestic Securities Markets
Recent reforms in the Chinese Securities Markets appear to be decreasing the
power of the State over the market, but are in fact actually creating a more flexible and
powerful means for the government to unfairly benefit at the use of its markets. The
classification of shares based on the origins of ownership and the split share reform are
two very subtle methods which combined actually increase the State’s unfair advantage
in the market.
a. Classification of Stocks
The classification of stocks based on ownership has the effect of keeping a large
number of foreign investors from participating in China’s securities markets. Absent
large QFII’s and other special international investors which are allowed to trade in A
Shares, the rest of the outside world is restricted to B shares which have an intrinsically
lower value and are very rarely offered by Chinese companies.236 This has the effect of
excluding the vast majority of the world’s investors from the Chinese market.237
The exclusion of smaller foreign investors from the Chinese market is actually
advantageous to the government for at least two reasons. First, China is able to avoid
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strict scrutiny over unfair practices in its markets. While China has complete control over
its domestic press, it could not prevent international investors who were aggrieved by the
situation of unfair market practices and lax enforcement to openly criticize and expose
the Chinese government’s role.238
The classification of stocks and the restrictions limit foreign investors to large
institutional investors. These investors are very sophisticated and successful investors
who are capable of obtaining sufficient information to make wise investment choices in
Chinese companies. However, smaller, less sophisticated investors would be more likely
to make unwise investment choices and be harmed as a result. The cry of injustice from
this multitude of ‘little guy’ investors would attract more public sympathy and pressure
their governments to confront China about its unfair domestic markets. This is a situation
that China’s stock classification effectively avoids.
Secondly, by largely restricting the domestic market, China is preventing
foreigners from taking strategic stakes in the Chinese economy.239 This appears to be a
method the Chinese government is using as evidenced by its $711 billion dollar stake
directly in the US government through debt. Such a strategic stake is beneficial to the
Chinese government because the threat of calling in debts and the desire of countries like
the US to borrow more money likely has the effect of chilling attempts to openly criticize
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unfair trade practices of the Chinese government or their support of human rights abuses
and alliances with terrorist states.240
In addition it provides a security blanket for the activities of Chinese companies
since they are insulted from the rest of the world by complete ownership of their strategic
industries. There is little threat foreign investment could inadvertently reveal sensitive
national security plans within China, such as how the massive amounts of spending on
the military is being utilized through domestic contracts.241

b. Split Share Reform
The split share reform program has the effect of streamlining the governments
internal investment and making strategic acquisitions and sales easier for the government.
Since the government is no longer constrained by rules which require it to retain large
shares of un-profitable companies the government is able to shed these companies and
reinvest their money in more profitable companies and thus increase their control over
important industries and increase revenue. Such a practice does not in itself seem unfair
as long as the Chinese government does not use it to create an unfair advantage in the
market.
What the split share reform has essentially accomplished is allow much greater
flexibility to the Chinese government to participate in the market. This flexibility only
makes the Chinese governments participation more efficient, which is of course the goal.
240
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It should be noted that in companies that really matter, the same ones the government is
holding unto or increasing its stake in, there is no benefit to the shareholders since the
management structure of these companies will remain unchanged. Thus saying that the
program is a market reform intended to benefit the shareholders would be inaccurate.
c. CSRC
The CSRC is hugely ineffective when it comes to dealing with abuses by SOE’s
in the market. The CSRC and SOE’s have the same boss, the State Council and
ultimately the CCP. The CSRC is very much unlikely going to investigate or discipline
large SOE’s because it would in fact be disciplining itself. This situation is further
aggrieved by the State’s complete control over the personnel and budge of the CSRC
which are both inadequate to effectively regulation all of China’s listed companies.
The Chinese government is subtle about reigning in the CSRC due to its public
role of investor protection. For instance the government would decrease the CSRC’s
already sorely under funded budget because that would be an obvious indication to the
public that the governments priority is not really the shareholders protection. However,
the government through its control of the media is able to make scapegoats out of
enforcement friendly CSRC personnel and have them removed such as the case of
director Zhou in 2002. Through actions such as these the Government is able to minimize
the enforcement role of the CSRC.

d. SASAC
The SASAC is a very powerful tool of the government in increasing its control
over the market. The SASAC is the centralized owner over the largest and most
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important SOE’s in China reporting directly to the State. This consolidation has created a
more loyal servant to the government by cutting out the provincial or military owners
which might have objectives that differ from the central government.
The SASAC also has the very powerful affect of concerted action. Sitting at the
top of the most important industries in China the SASAC is able to have significant
control over supply chains, certain markets, and other economic factors that can be
affected by a network of enormous enterprises acting in concert. This advantage has the
effect of making sure that SASAC companies have a dominant market position. Of
course this is the purpose of the SASAC.242 However, this also has the effect of greatly
distorting the domestic market.
The SASAC is also a central clearing house of information about the companies it
owns. All the companies that the SASAC owns provide it with detailed financial
information which would normally only be available to a purely public organization like
the CSRC. This information is powerful because it allows the SASAC to gauge the
performance of huge market players prior to the time that anyone has this information.
With the split share reform the SASAC is now free to trade on this information.
For example, the SASAC could obtain information from one its mining companies that a
large deposit of copper has been discovered thus driving down the price of copper. The
SASAC could then increase its investment in any company which the state has significant
investment in that really heavily on the use of cooper such as a electric wire manufacturer
whose shares are likely to increase in value due to the decline in the price of copper. Or
the SASAC could obtain information concerning important political or economic moves
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soon to be made by the government concerning certain sectors of the economy and trade
on that information.

e. Courts
Even if the CSRC found violations of SOE’s in the market there would be little
redress due to the fact that the courts are controlled by and defer to the government. It is
highly unlikely that the Courts are going to discipline SOE’s because the governments
that own them also in effect own the Courts.
The Courts have already gone along with the government on stopping one of the
most effective means of market regulation, private securities litigation. While the Courts
have recently created civil liability for misrepresentation, there are currently no civil torts
for breach of fiduciary duty and insider information.
The lack of private securities litigation serves the government in other ways as
well. There is a cultural disconnect with the adversarial process that could be borne
directly out of the CCP’s fear of social unrest.243 This fear of unrest is a good candidate
for limitation of private actors suing companies which are largely controlled by the state,
and of increasing regulation which could expose not only the state companies themselves
to liability but also to expose the system of economic control held by the CCP.
f. The Torts
1. Duty of Care
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The Chinese government has not been encouraging making breach of fiduciary
duties an actionable violation of the law. This is because the fiduciary duty in China’s
SOE’s is not really to the shareholders but rather to the State, which could have very
different investment objectives considering it’s vast market control and ability to leverage
companies against each other.
In addition the SASAC and other state actors such as local governments have an
inherent conflict of interest between their different holdings. For example the SASAC
may have control of the two competing mining companies. With directors on boards of
these two companies the SASAC would likely be less willing to compete with each in a
market environment to secure a certain assets such as government contracts. This would
stagnant the share price as neither company bet the other in bidding on the asset which
would have the effect of increasing share price.
The recent attempts by the CSRC to define the fiduciary duties in the Governance
Code are inadequate. First of all there is little to no real disciplinary measures set out in
the Governance Code. This is a fact that will likely be recognized by the Courts when
they refuse to hear cases based on breach of fiduciary duty. In addition the duties
themselves are very vague. In the Civil Law system defining these duties in a statute is an
almost impossible task and courts as well as the CSRC will have little to no direction
when determining whether certain actions of SOE’s constitute a breach of fiduciary
duties.
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2. Insider Information
With large state shareholders such as the SASAC and local governments having
several different holdings the availability of inside information to these organizations is
inherent. For example two companies competing on a contract would likely be aware of
the position of the other company. There is nothing preventing local governments or the
SASAC from exchanging this information between the two. There are no laws saying that
the SASAC can not exchange information learned in one of its companies with another.
The insider trading law does not seem to include the SASAC under its definition of who
can have inside information. This complete lack of regulation concerning insider
information in the laws governing the SASAC indicates that the government is not
prepared to limit these companies from exchanging insider information.

ii. WTO
There are several aspects of the Chinese capital markets which could be
considered violations of China’s WTO agreements. For example, in affect the SASAC is
a government subsidy since the Government is providing goods and services in the way
of facilities and manpower to SOE’s in order to boost their competitiveness. The Chinese
government established the SASAC, has oversight over it, and provides for its funding
and infrastructure. The SASAC has definitely conferred a benefit to the companies under
there control as evidenced by their increase in market value.
In the abstract a regulatory regime that is conducive to Insider information
violations could be considered a subsidy. Indirectly permitting SOE’s to trade on insider
information due to the lax regulatory framework to prevent it can allow for benefits
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between domestic companies that distort trade with international companies competing in
the domestic market. By allowing for, or at least not effectively regulating, insider
information the Chinese government is allowing indirectly a benefit to be conferred on
the domestic industries. This constitutes a financial contribution indirectly because it
allows the SOE’s to use inside information to increase their share price just as sure as if
the government had given them the extra money themselves.
In sum, these perceived legal inadequacies in China’s securities market regulation
which in effect benefit the Government both economically and politically calls for a
paradigm shift to assessing the China securities market reforms based on their actual
intended objectives.

Part IVB: New Paradigm244
The paradigm of suggesting that increasingly the amount of western-styled
reforms into the Chinese securities regulation framework simply does not work, because
it is based on a misconception about what the Chinese securities market really is and
what recent reforms are intended to accomplish. This article has attempted to show that
the Chinese securities market is nothing like a real securities market but is rather a
mechanism controlled by the Chinese government in order to increase its own revenue
and allow it to compete more effectively on the global market. In effect it is a
government piggy bank.
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The traditional conception of a securities market is as a mechanism whereby
capital can be most effectively raised and distributed to the most effective corporations
with the benefit going to the shareholder. The traditional market is regulated by an uninterested third party that seeks no benefit within the market for itself. Under these
conditions incorporating corporate governance mechanisms like fiduciary duties and
strict prohibition against insider trading can and are usually effective. However this is not
what the Chinese securities market is.
The Chinese securities market is a mechanism whereby capital can be most
effectively raised and distributed for the benefit of the government. The communist
government in China claims to hold all its assets in the name of the people under the
constitution. This makes government ownership and prosperity a national priority to
which individual gain is subjected.245 In this type of market objecting to the government
prospering at the expense of the individual shareholders is not tolerated.
Referring to the primary motivators of money and power discussed earlier, these
motivators shed a great deal of light on the Chinese securities market. The Chinese
government is seeking both essential power and money from its involvement in the
securities market. It is seeking power by establishing an insolated securities market which
is not foreign investor friendly in order to prevent the same market leverage it has used
against countries like the US from being used on itself.
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The Chinese government’s motivations for seeking money from the securities
markets are numerous. For one they simply wish to cut the cost of providing social
benefits to the populace. By having an effective control over the supply side of the
economy the government can reduce its cost through defeating competition which would
increase the costs of goods and services it is required to provide its citizens. Secondly the
government is promoting national security by giving it the money it needs to ensure that
it will be an effective competitor in international markets for such critical goods as oil.
Thirdly it is attempting to prevent civil unrest and provide jobs for its citizens.
The Chinese securities market than is a government piggy bank whose proceeds
are used in the national interest in order to promote social stability and keep the CCP in
power. This reflects major differences with western markets based on a fundamental
ideological difference.
In Western countries, capital markets exist for the benefit of the corporation and
ultimately for the shareholder, who uses his share value to presumably increase the
quality of life and pay for the basic necessities. In China, capital markets exist for the
benefit of the corporation, particularly ones owned by the government, and ultimately for
the government itself, who uses its share value to increase the quality of life for all
citizens and pay for their basic necessities. Viewed from this perspective, critical
analysis of laws affecting Chinese securities markets should shift dramatically.

Part IVC. Suggestions Based on New Paradigm
Viewing the legal framework of Chinese capital markets through this new
paradigm minimizes the effectiveness of advocating for the adoption of Western style

62

reforms in Chinese capital markets. The Chinese government is well aware of how
foreign markets work and likely know exactly what they could do to make theirs a fair
and equal market. However, they have not done so, because there is no will to do it. This
leaves the paradigm of suggesting western ways to make the market more fair and equal
in shatters.
Since the Chinese government is using its domestic markets to increase its
competitiveness in the international market and likely has no desire to fix its market,
because it would hurt the interest of the Government, options for effective regulation to
prevent an unfair advantage in international trade might have to come from outside of
China.
The easiest way to impact unfair competition in Chinese domestic markets is
investigation and education. Little research has been done on the Chinese government’s
direct influence in its domestic markets through actual participation. Of course, this
information is terribly difficult to come by due to the fact that the Chinese government is
able to partially restrict the freedom of press and is certainly not going to be willing to
detail its unfair market involvements. Another reason this information is so hard to get is
the lack of information made available to researchers in foreign languages. However,
empirical evidence must be obtained otherwise mere speculation regarding unfair
practices will never induce correction.246
There are two additional ways that outside influences might effectively correct
the Chinese domestic market; international organizations and direct investment
restrictions imposed by individual foreign governments. The default candidate for a
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corrective international organization is the WTO which is the only international body
with a dispute resolution mechanism. Actions could be initiated at the WTO to
investigate the distortion in the Chinese market and how that gives China an unfair trade
advantage over other nations. Specifically, the WTO could recognize that Chinese lax
enforcement and participation through organizations like the SASAC constitute a
government subsidy. This would allow other countries to take countervailing measures
against Chinese goods and thus force the Chinese government to adopt a different
strategy for increasing its competitiveness.
However, there are serious flaws with the WTO system which would likely
prevent such a large scale effort against one of the most power economic countries on the
planet.247 The scope of the problems with WTO enforcement is beyond the scope of this
article. However, it is possible that even if the WTO were to initiate enforcement in
certain instances, it is possible that China’s economic partners would ignore WTO
regulations of China in exchange for beneficial trade agreements, the type of which the
WTO is met to prevent.
Another method to counter China’s unfair market practices would domestic
divestment campaigns. A couple of US states have already passed legislation prohibiting
public pension funds from investing in companies deal with terrorist sponsoring
countries.248 Such measures have been taken in the past against countries like South
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Africa during apartheid.249 Of course to have any real impact on China’s domestic market
such campaign would have to greatly increase in scope to include such things as aiding
human rights abuses or unfair market activities which detrimentally affect the US
economy.
While there is no obvious solution to the problem of China’s inadequate capital
market regulation these meager solutions are intended to invoke a sense of how legal
scholars can view solutions to Chinese legal reforms as viewed through the new
paradigm.
Conclusion
This article has attempted to make the case for a paradigm shift from viewing
Chinese capital markets as in need of better Western style reforms to China’s
unwillingness and inability to pursue such reforms as evidenced by the current
intentionally unfair legal framework. With this paradigm shift comes new implications
for future legal analysis of Chinese domestic capital markets.
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